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Abstract 
 
The importance of security engineering in the development cycle is widely accepted. In spite of 
the large variety of security requirements elicitation techniques, organizations struggle to select 
the most suitable security requirements elicitation method that would enable the elicitation of 
security requirements with the most complete coverage. 
Two potential solutions exist to this problem; Security Quality Requirements Engineering 
(SQUARE) and Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP). SQUARE 
is an already established and widely used security requirements elicitation method that addresses 
security early in the software development cycle. On the other hand, SREBP is a new approach 
that helps derive security requirements from operational business processes. To address the 
above mentioned issue, this thesis compares the two methods based on an empirical case study of 
the Estonian Football Association. The elicited security requirements are categorized and the 
completeness of their coverage is compared. 
As a result, it was determined that SREBP provides more coverage of the security requirements. 
Such a result contributes to the existing literature by further strengthening the validity of SREBP. 
 
Key words: Security Engineering, Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE), 
Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP), Security requirements, 
Empirical comparison. 
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Turvanõuete Tuletamise Meetodite Empiiriline Võrdlus 
Lühikokkuvõte 
 
Kaasaegne töökeskond on tihedalt seotud infotehnoloogiaga (edaspidi IT). Seoses IT laialdase 
kasutamisega kõigis eluvaldkondades on üles kerkinud küsimus selle turvalisusest. Turvalisuse 
tagamine IT valdkonnas on tähtsal kohal. Vaatamata erinevate turvalisuse nõuete saavutamise 
meetodite rohkusele võib ettevõtetel ja asutustel olla keeruline leida sobivat meetodit tagamaks 
piisav IT turvalisus. 
Antud probleemi lahendamiseks võrdlesin kaht meetodit Eesti Jalgpalliliidus (EJL) läbiviidud 
juhtumuuringus. Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) on laialt kasutust leidev 
turvalisuse nõuete tuletamise metood, mis paneb rõhku varajase disainiastme riskikaalutlustele.  
Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP) on uus metood, mis 
võimaldab tuletada turvalisuse nõudeid äriprotsesside analüüsist. Tuletatud turvalisuse nõuded 
paigutasin võrdlevatesse kategooriatesse, mille abil sain määrata nende tõhususastme. 
Uuringu tulemusena selgus, et SREBP meetodi kasutamisel saadud tulem vastas rohkem 
turvalisuse tagamise nõuetele. See uuring kinnitab SREBP meetodi tulemuslikkust ja 
usaldusväärsust. 
 
Võtmesõnad: Infoturve, SQUARE, SREBP, turvanõuded, empiirline võrdlus. 
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1 Introduction 
Security Engineering and Requirements Engineering have become integral features of enterprise 
operations over the last decade. Security engineering is an engineering discipline, the aim of 
which is to lower the risk of intentional and unauthorized harm to stakeholder’s assets to an 
acceptable level. This is done through preventing, detecting or reacting to such harm (Firesmith, 
2007). Requirements engineering, a field closely related to security engineering, is an 
engineering discipline concerned with identifying, analyzing, specifying, managing, reusing and 
validating goals and requirements including security related requirements (Firesmith, 2007). 
These are vital to ensure that a business is able to complete projects on time and within budget 
constraints as the failure to properly carry out security and requirements engineering bears the 
risk of incurring additional development costs to rectify the mistakes made during development 
(Mead et al. 2005). As a result, security requirements engineering is carried out for both projects 
in the design phase and ongoing processes. It is important to integrate security engineering as 
early as possible into the project design phase as carrying out any changes to the design of the 
system or implementing new features is costly both in terms of time and resources. However, 
security engineering should also be carried out on processes and projects which have already 
been implemented in order to lower the risk of harm to the stakeholders’ assets.  
A number of different approaches (Demirörs et al, 2003; Backes et al, 2003; Hermann et al, 
2011; Mead et al. 2005) exist to allow security engineers and business analysts to carry out 
security and requirements engineering, however these approaches are generally not applicable to 
the needs of all enterprises. Examples of the shortfalls of these methods include the lack of a 
systematic approach to security requirements elicitation (Hermann et al, 2011); (Backes et al, 
2003) and the lack of a graphical or model based representation for requirements elicitation 
(Demirörs et al, 2003). Despite a large number of different security requirements elicitation 
techniques, organizations struggle to find the most suitable security requirements elicitation 
method that would produce security requirements with the most complete coverage. 
Two potential solutions exist that address this issue. The first is Security Requirements 
Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP, Ahmed, 2015) developed at the University of Tartu 
to address the issues mentioned above. SREBP allows for the elicitation of security requirements 
from business process models. This method addresses a number of the shortcomings that plague 
other approaches such as the lack of a systematic approach to requirements elicitation and the 
lack of a graphical representation for requirements elicitation by directly eliciting security 
objectives from the business processes and then systematically eliciting security requirements 
from the operational business processes (Ahmed, 2015). 
The other potential solution to these issues is Security Quality Requirements Engineering 
(SQUARE) (Mead et al. 2005). The SQUARE method is a systematic, yet flexible nine-step 
method to elicit security requirements. SQUARE does not specify an exact technique for 
requirements elicitation; instead it allows the security engineer to choose a suitable technique for 
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it themselves as a means of eliminating some of the shortcomings of other security requirements 
elicitation methods described previously. 
Therefore, to find a solution to the underlying problems described above, this thesis aims to 
compare the two abovementioned methods to answer the following research question: 
Research Question: Which security requirements elicitation method, SQUARE or SREBP, 
helps to identify a more complete list of security requirements? 
To answer this research question, an empirical comparison of the coverage of the security 
requirements elicited with SQUARE and SREBP is carried out. The basis for the empirical 
comparison is the case study based on the Estonian Football Association (EFA).  
The empirical comparison of the security requirements is carried out by applying a method 
developed in Ahmed and Matulevicius (2015). The security requirements are compared in terms 
of their completeness of coverage of confidentiality, integrity and availability in eight different 
categories (Ahmed and Matulevicius, 2015). For each category, the completeness of coverage 
can range from 0%, if the security requirements do not provide any coverage, to 100%, if the 
security requirements provide full coverage. The aggregated results are compiled together to 
determine the overall completeness of coverage provided by the security requirements elicited 
with both SQUARE and SREBP. 
This thesis contributes to the existing research in the security engineering domain by providing 
an empirical analysis of two security requirements elicitation methods SREBP and SQUARE. 
SREBP has only been applied to one other case study based on a different organization. The case 
study examined in this thesis is based on the EFA, which did not have security solutions in place 
and did not have business processes modeled unlike the organization examined in the other case 
study. Despite these differences, the findings of this thesis are in line with previous work, thus 
contributing to reinforcing the validity of SREBP.  
This thesis is divided into 7 chapters and the appendix. Chapter 1 covers the introduction, 
research question and main overview of the paper. Chapter 2 provides an overview of Security 
Engineering, Business Process Management and Security Requirements Engineering as 
background concepts of the field of study. Chapter 3 provides the overview of the two methods, 
SQUARE and SREBP along with a theoretical comparison of the two methods. Chapter 4 
describes the research question and explains the design of the empirical study. Chapter 5 presents 
the application of SREBP and SQUARE as the empirical study of this thesis. Chapter 6 presents 
the outcome of the comparative analysis of the two methods along with the answer to the 
research question. Chapter 7 states the conclusions of the thesis with recommendations for areas 
for further study. 
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2 Background Information 
Security Engineering is recognized to be critically important in any business project that aims to 
be successful. It helps save a significant amount of money during the development and 
contributes to the overall success chance of the project (Mead et al, 2005). This thesis is to 
contribute to the literature in such area of study. As background knowledge, this chapter explains 
the basic concepts in the Security Engineering domain and explains its connection to Business 
Process Management. Additionally, the different methods used for security requirements 
elicitation in the Security Engineering domain are listed. The shortcomings and issues that these 
methods face are covered as well. Two potential solutions to these problems are briefly 
mentioned. Lastly, an overview of the ISSRM Domain model is given to explain how the results 
of the security requirements elicitation are standardized. 
2.1 Security Engineering and Business Process Management 
 
Security engineering is an engineering discipline that is concerned with lowering the risk of 
intentional malicious harm to valuable assets through reacting to threats and security risks and 
implementing security measures (Andersen, 2001). It is a multifaceted discipline that makes use 
of a large variety of different methodological approaches and tools. These tools differ from each 
other in terms of their application and the results they produce.  
An important facet of the Security Engineering domain is Business Process Management (BPM). 
It is a systematic and continuous approach to improving a company’s workflow, marketing, 
management and other important aspects of a company’s operations (Zairi, 1997). BPM can be 
used to link security concerns to business goals through the use of specific methods and business 
process modeling languages. One of these languages is Business Process Management and 
Notation (BPMN). BPMN provides graphical notations to describe the various steps in a 
business process using signifiers for events, actors, activities, artifacts, resources and their 
relations. The current version of BPMN being used is Version 2.0, released in 2011. In order to 
tackle security issues using BPM, an understanding of what constitutes a business processes must 
be achieved. According to the Workflow Management Coalition, a global organization 
consisting of individuals and organizations engaged in Business process management, a business 
process is “a set of one or more linked procedures or activities which collectively realise a 
business objective or policy goal, normally within the context of an organisational structure 
defining functional roles and relationships” (WMC, 1999). Business process based security 
requirements elicitation enables the elicitation of security requirements which are in-line with the 
organization’s business goals.  
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2.2 Security Requirements Elicitation 
 
One of the methods used within Security Engineering, utilizing BPM, is requirements 
engineering. Requirements engineering is an engineering discipline concerned with identifying, 
analyzing, specifying, managing, reusing and validating goals and requirements including 
security related requirements (Firesmith, 2007). Security requirements engineering is a subset of 
requirements engineering that focuses almost exclusively on security related requirements. A 
number of different methods exist for security requirements elicitation within the domain of 
Security Engineering. Ranging from multilateral approaches such as Multilateral Security 
Requirements Analysis (MSRA, Gürses et al, 2006) and SQUARE (Mead et al, 2005) to UML 
based approaches such as Misuse cases (Sindre et al, 2001), SecureUML (Lodderstedt et al, 
2002) and UMLsec (Jürjens, 2003) and Goal based approaches such as Secure Tropos (Bresciani 
et al, 2004) and Knowledge Acquisition in Automated Specification (KAOS) (Bertrand et al, 
1998).  
In addition to the methods described above, there exist specific methods for security 
requirements elicitation, that use business processes as their basis. In Demirörs et al (2003) 
business processes are taken as the baseline from which security requirements are elicited. 
However security related concepts are not mentioned and no graphical notation of the security 
requirements elicitation is used, thus hampering the usefulness of the method. Another method is 
presented in Backes et al (2003) in which business process models are used as a baseline to 
implement cryptographic solutions to satisfy security requirements. However this process fails to 
explain how the security requirements themselves are elicited. A more thorough example of a 
business process based security requirements elicitation technique is presented in Hermann et al 
(2011). This method explains security domain concepts, business goals, controls and 
prioritization of requirements. However, it does not present a structured, systematic method to 
elicit security requirements. The drawbacks of the examples described illustrate the difficulties 
organizations face when trying to choose the security requirements elicitation method that would 
provide the most complete coverage. 
As mentioned above, a number of shortcomings plague the security requirements elicitation 
methods which use business processes as their basis. There exist two potential solutions which 
can address these shortcomings. One of these solutions is SREBP, a novel security requirements 
elicitation technique which focuses on utilizing business processes to systematically elicit 
security requirements (Ahmed, 2015). The other potential solution is SQUARE, which offers a 
nine-step process for eliciting security requirements (Mead et al, 2005). These two approaches 
are explored in more detail in the subsequent chapter.  
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2.3 ISSRM Domain model  
 
The ISSRM domain model presents commonly found concepts of the security risk domain based 
on the analysis of different IT security standards, security risk management methods and 
software engineering frameworks (Mayer et al 2007). These concepts and their relations are 
shown in Figure 1 as the ISSRM domain model which combines three concepts for its risk 
management approach: asset-related, risk-related and risk treatment-related concepts (Dubois et 
al, 2010). 
Asset-related concept covers the definition of business and Information System (IS) assets and 
security criterion. Business assets are immaterial assets that bring value to the company, IS assets 
are material information system related assets that support the business assets. Security criterion 
refers to the security needs of the business assets based on Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability (CIA). 
Risk-related concepts cover risk and its constituent parts such as threats, vulnerabilities, threat 
agents, events, impacts and attack methods (Dubois et al, 2010). Risk treatment-related concept 
covers risk mitigation. In this thesis, the author has used his discretion to choose the most 
appropriate security requirements based on the feasibility of the application for potential controls 
(Dubois et al, 2010).  
The author utilizes the ISSRM domain model (Dubois et al, 2010) as the methodological 
framework to standardize the application of SREBP and SQUARE to make the results more 
comparable. SREBP utilizes the concepts outlined in the ISSRM domain model whereas 
SQUARE does not (Ahmed, 2015);(Mead et al, 2005). However for the purpose of this empirical 
study, the author utilizes the ISSRM domain model approach for security requirements 
elicitation within SQUARE to ensure that the elicited security requirements have comparability 
with security requirements elicited through SREBP. 
Figure 1 illustrates the ISSRM Domain model and the relationships between the different 
concepts. To distinguish between the different conceptual areas, different colours are used to 
represent them.  
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Figure 1: ISSRM model, adapted from (Dubois et al, 2010) 
                        
Figure 2: ISSRM 6-step process, adapted from (Mayer et al 2007)  
Figure 2 presents the process integrated into ISSRM for risk management. These general steps 
are integrated into a number of risk management approaches such as OCTAVE (Alberts et al, 
1999) SQUARE (Mead et al, 2005) and CORAS (Braber et al, 2007).  
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2.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the various security engineering related concepts, such as BPM, Business 
processes, Security Requirements Engineering and ISSRM, were explained to provide 
background information regarding the security engineering domain. This revealed that there are 
certain problems with security requirements elicitation methods. The next chapter gives an in-
depth look at two possible solutions to these problems, SQUARE and SREBP.  
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3 Approaches for Security Requirements Elicitation 
In the previous chapter, SQUARE and SREBP were presented as the potential solutions for the 
problems present in the Security Engineering domain. In this chapter, the author introduces these 
two methods in detail and presents a theoretical comparison of both methods. 
3.1 Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) method 
 
Security Quality Requirements Engineering (Mead et al, 2005) is a method to enhance the 
security of a product, from the early development stage in its life cycle. It has been in 
development for more than a decade by Nancy Mead, Donald Firesmith and Carol Woody at the 
Carnegie Mellon University in the United States (Mead et al, 2005). 
The main aim of the method concerns Information Technology systems with a focus on software 
applications. It aims to list, categorize and prioritize security requirements for IT systems and 
applications (Mead et al, 2005). The method categorizes security requirements as non-functional, 
meaning that the main goal of the systems being analyzed is not necessarily about security. This 
allows the SQUARE method to be applied to projects which tackle the issues of security as an 
afterthought (Mead et al, 2005). 
The approach consists of nine steps and facilitates the use of different approaches and techniques 
for artifact development, risk assessment, security requirements elicitation and filtering 
requirements. This means that the approach is flexible and can be used in a variety of different 
situations. However at the same time this also presents some drawbacks as the lack of clear 
guidance can lead to results that may seem disconnected or where it might be difficult to 
determine the exact workflow that produced these results (Mead et al, 2005). 
In terms of validation, each step in the SQUARE process has exit criteria that must be met before 
the next step can begin. Additionally, the final step deals exclusively with validation of the 
security requirements (Fabian et al, 2010). 
Figure 3 displays the necessary steps for carrying out SQUARE. These steps are used to develop 
concrete security requirements involving the work of the project stakeholders as well as the 
security requirements engineers.  
The initial step for the application of SQUARE method involves the stakeholders in the project 
and the security requirements engineers. The goal for the first step is to agree on definitions for 
the process. These definitions need to be agreed upon to ensure that everyone involved in the 
process has a clear understanding of what each term that will be used means in the context of the 
SQUARE process (Mead et al, 2005).  
The following step involves the stakeholders deciding upon the initial security goals. 
Stakeholders from different departments may have different priorities, hence it is important to 
agree on which issues need to be tackled first (Mead et al, 2005). The security goals should not 
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hamper the operation of the system itself. The goals also need to be prioritized. A business goal 
and a number of security goals must be produced by the end of step 2.  
3.1.1 SQUARE steps 
 
  
Figure 3: SQUARE steps adapted from (Mead et al, 2005)  
Step 3 involves developing or collecting artifacts of the system being worked on. These artifacts 
include misuse diagrams, goals, attack trees and other relevant diagrams (Mead et al, 2005). 
These are important as the security requirements elicitation will be based on those factors. 
Step 4 is a thorough risk analysis. This should cover all the vulnerabilities along with a 
classification of all threats and their likelihoods as well. These results will have to be shared with 
the stakeholders as well (Mead et al, 2005). No specific method for carrying out the risk 
assessment is provided in SQUARE, instead the security requirements engineers will have to 
choose one at their discretion based on the project at hand.  
Step 5 covers the selection of the most appropriate security requirements elicitation technique. 
The decision of choosing a particular technique must be based on the specifics of the company or 
the project being worked on. 
Step 6, security requirements elicitation is arguably the most important step in the SQUARE 
method. Security requirements engineers will have to elicit concrete security requirements based 
1 
•Agree on Definitions 
2 
•Agree on Security Goals 
3 
•Develop Artifacts for Security requirements elicitation 
4 •Risk assessment 
5 
•Select a risk requirement elicitation technique 
6 
•Elicit security requirements 
7 
•Categorize and filter requirements 
8 
•Prioritize requirements 
9 
•Inspect the requirements 
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on the results of the previous steps. These requirements will have to be concise and easily 
verifiable (Mead et al, 2005).  
Step 7 concerns the categorization of the requirements. Security engineers will have to work 
together with the stakeholders to determine the appropriate categories for the security 
requirements. Additionally, requirements that will result in architectural constraints should be 
separated (Mead et al, 2005).  
Step 8 is the prioritization of the security requirements. Stakeholders will have to decide which 
security requirements are the most vital. The requirements engineering team can additionally 
produce a cost effectiveness study to aid the stakeholders. (Mead et al, 2005) 
The last step is the requirements inspection. In this step, the requirements which have been 
produced through the previous SQUARE steps will be scrutinized to ensure that each 
requirement is valid and verifiable. Each of the requirements should be financially feasible for 
implementation as well (Mead et al, 2005).  
3.1.2 Previous Implementations of SQUARE 
SQUARE has been implemented in a number of cases previously. Not all implementations of 
SQUARE make use of the nine steps laid out previously (Chen et al, 2004). This will also be the 
case in this study. This is due to the fact that some of the steps in SQUARE do not have a 
comparable equivalent in SREBP, thus a comparison between the two in this regard is not 
possible. Another example of SQUARE application is the development of SQUARE-Lite 
(Gayash et al, 2008). From these examples, it can be observed, that SQUARE steps can be 
omitted or combined when the approach is being implemented. 
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3.2 Security Requirement Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP) 
 
The SREBP method involves the identification of business assets and security objectives based 
on the business Value Chain (Ahmed and Matulevicius, 2014b). This is followed by the security 
requirements elicitation stage comprising of five steps. The SREBP method seeks to address 
many of the shortcomings of current security requirements elicitation methods using business 
processes. Security requirements elicitation is usually done haphazardly, which can result in 
critical requirements not being elicited. Other methods focus on particular contextual areas of 
business processes (access control, separation of duties) without exploring the overall security of 
the business processes. These methods often specify requirements in the context of security 
architectural design while not explaining the rationale behind the trade-offs of the security 
decisions (Ahmed and Matulevicius, 2014b). The SREBP method aims to address these 
shortcomings by giving a description of the overall security goals while focusing on the security 
requirements elicitation based on business processes. 
3.2.1 SREBP stages 
The initial stage in the SREBP method involves gathering information pertaining to the 
enterprise’s value system which includes features such as the Value Chain and the business 
functions (Ahmed, 2015). The Value Chain displays the main business functions of the 
enterprise and shows how they are connected. Analysis of the Value Chain is vital in determining 
which business assets must be protected against security risks. Additionally, BPMN models are 
used to provide further details needed for the security requirements elicitation. After the 
identification of the business assets, the security objectives can be determined. This usually 
pertains to the protection of the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of the business 
assets. The SREBP stages of implementation are presented in Figure 4.  
The second stage involves the security requirements elicitation itself. The security requirements 
are elicited in five different contextual areas (Ahmed, 2015). These five contextual areas are 
derived from previous work covered by the authors of the SREBP method (Alter, 2006). SREBP 
offers a targeted and systematic analysis of the system’s contextual areas in order to elicit 
security requirements. Other security requirement elicitation techniques that use business 
processes mainly focus on the graphical representation of security requirements, not on the actual 
requirements elicitation as explained in section 2.2. 
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Figure 4: SREBP Security Requirements Elicitation Method adapted from (Ahmed et al, 2014) 
 
SREBP also covers the development of security objectives and the conversion of these objectives 
into concrete security requirements. The five contextual areas for analysis in SREBP are: 
 Access control – covers internal and external concerns in relation to access control 
policies that pertain to assignment of roles, which operations they are allowed to carry 
out in relation to the protected assets. The major aim is to protect the confidentiality of 
the identified business assets. The authors of SREBP have opted to use the Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC) model to illustrate this step of the security requirements 
elicitation. 
 Communication channel – covers data exchange between different entities. This entails 
the transmission of data over external networks such as the internet. If communications 
between two entities are compromised then there is a risk of misuse of the captured data. 
 Input interfaces – covers how input data is treated before processing. The availability and 
integrity of activities that follow the input interface must be preserved as the threat agent 
may inject malicious scripts into the submission fields.  
 Network infrastructure – covers the infrastructure of the network where business 
operations are carried out, also includes protection of business service availability. This 
concerns activities or tasks which are executed within the enterprise on behalf of the 
business partners. 
 Data store – covers data protection in terms of storage and retrieving the data. This also 
covers the associated databases. If a threat agent is capable of accessing and retrieving 
the data, the confidentiality and integrity of the data can be compromised. 
Each of these contextual areas is examined using a security risk oriented pattern (Ahmed and 
Matulevicius, 2015). 
 
Value Chain 
Stage 1: Business Assets Identification & 
Security Objectives determination 
Business Assets and 
Security Objectives 
Stage 2: Security Requirement Elicitation 
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3.2.2 Security Patterns 
Security patterns are particular reoccurring security problems that arise in specific context and 
provide a generic scheme for developing security solutions (Schumacher et al, 2006). These 
security patterns were further developed into security risk-oriented patterns which allow for 
business processes to be aligned with security requirements (Ahmed and Matulevicius, 2014a). 
For the application of the SREBP method, five security risk-oriented patterns outlined in Ahmed 
and Matulevicius, (2014a) are utilized, these were developed by the authors of SREBP. These 
patterns were developed by developing a template and identifying the context in which the 
security risk-oriented patterns would be used in. The context outlined in Alter (2006) is 
transformed into the five contextual areas described above, for each contextual area; one security 
risk-oriented pattern is utilized. An example of a security risk-oriented pattern is SRP 1, which 
has to secure the data transmitted between business entities (Ahmed, 2015). Data transmitted 
between the client and the business could be intercepted by a hostile party, thus violating the 
integrity and confidentiality of the data. SRP 1 therefore introduces the security requirement of 
making data unreadable and to verify the received data (Ahmed, 2015).  
3.2.3 Previous Implementations of SREBP 
At the time of writing of this paper, the SREBP method has only been applied on one case study. 
The Estonian Genome Centre was chosen as the case study and the implementation carried out 
produced a comprehensive set of security requirements (Ahmed, 2015). The referred paper also 
detailed a comparison between SREBP and SQUARE, both having been applied to the same case 
study. To compare both methods, the author had decided to compare the completeness of 
security requirements. To do that, several categories were elicited and each security requirement 
was categorized and analyzed. The study showed, that on average, the security requirements 
elicited via SREBP provided a 80% coverage whereas the security requirements elicited via 
SQUARE only provided a 36% coverage. That study concluded that SREBP provided better 
coverage of security requirements than SQUARE (Ahmed, 2015) 
 
3.3 Theoretical Comparison of SQUARE and SREBP 
 
After explaining SQUARE and SREBP above, this section presents a theoretical comparison of 
these methods in key contextual areas to illustrate the distinct similarities and differences in the 
application of both methods. 
Definition of concepts: SREBP utilizes the concepts presented in accordance with Information 
System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) Domain model (Dubois et al, 2010)  while 
SQUARE fails to define assets and vulnerabilities directly (Ahmed and Matulevicius, 2014b). 
These concepts may be present in the first step of SQUARE, the definition of terms, but they are 
not integrated into the framework of the method itself (Mead et al, 2005) 
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Requirements elicitation: SQUARE does not specify which methods should be used for 
security requirement elicitation.  In SREBP, the security requirements elicitation takes place 
using security risk-oriented patterns. Both methods cover the early stage of requirements 
elicitation. SREBP utilizes the business Value Chain and the identification of business asset to 
elicit early security requirements. SQUARE utilizes the definition of security goals and business 
goals and the interactions with stakeholders to determine the initial security requirements 
(Ahmed and Matulevicius, 2014b). 
Security Risk Management: As mentioned previously, SQUARE does not restrict the selection 
of techniques for security risk management and this leads to a lack of a systemic approach to 
security risk management (Mead et al, 2005). This could be alleviated however if the ISSRM 
domain model is used for security risk management as the steps in ISSRM would act to 
compensate for the inherent shortcomings of SQUARE. SREBP on the other hand has 
compliance to ISSRM due to utilizing security risk-oriented patterns (Ahmed and Matulevicius, 
2014a) in terms of security risk management.  
Traceability: SREBP facilitates the traceability of the security requirements as traceability is 
part of one of the main goals of the method itself (Ahmed and Matulevicius, 2014b). The close 
links between the business assets, the Value Chain and the security requirement elicitation 
activities facilitates this. The SQUARE approach is more rigid, due to the ambiguity in choosing 
the methods for several of its constituent steps, it may be difficult to connect all the individual 
steps together. 
Validation and Prioritization: SQUARE integrates validation and prioritization into its steps. 
This allows for the security engineers and the stakeholders to determine which requirements are 
feasible for implementation and which are not (Mead et al, 2005). SREBP does not yet support 
any validation or prioritization of the elicited security requirements (Ahmed. 2015) 
Security Requirement Reusability: SQUARE does not place restrictions on which method 
should be used for requirements elicitation. As a result, the reusability of security requirements 
depends entirely upon which requirements elicitation method is chosen by the security engineer 
(Mead et al, 2014). SREBP does not have any security requirement reusability set up either 
(Ahmed, 2015). This is something that can be improved in future implementations of SREBP. 
Compatibility with the ISSRM process: As described in the background chapter, the ISSRM 
process exemplifies the common steps that are integrated into many risk management processes. 
Both SQUARE and SREBP incorporate some if not all of the steps. 
1. Content and asset identification - SQUARE does not explicitly incorporate this step in its 
process, however in this thesis the ISSRM domain model is used as a baseline for the risk 
management step and thus this step is identified there. SREBP incorporates the content 
and asset identification as the first stage of the method. 
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2. Determining security objectives – SQUARE incorporates this step as stage 2 of the 
SQUARE method. In SREBP, this is incorporated into the first stage of the method. 
3. Risk Analysis and Assessment – This step is incorporated into the SQUARE method as 
step 4. As mentioned above, SQUARE does not explicitly state which technique should 
be used for this. In SREBP, this step is covered by the use of security risk-oriented 
patterns which represent the recurring risks. 
4. Risk Treatment – Neither SQUARE nor SREBP explicitly define this step. For 
SQUARE, it depends on which risk management technique is used, for SREBP, it is 
assumed that all risks in the form of security risk-oriented patterns will be mitigated. 
5. Security Requirements definition – SQUARE integrates this as step 6 of its method, but 
does not specify the technique that should be used for this. In SREBP this is integrated 
into the method as stage 2. 
6. Control Selection and Implementation – This step is missing in both SQUARE and 
SREBP, however this step can be followed with SQUARE if a technique for risk 
management is used as part of steps 4 and 6 of the SQUARE method. 
 
3.4 Summary 
Chapter 3 presented SQUARE and SREBP in detail as the potential solutions to the problems in 
the Security Engineering domain mentioned in the previous chapter. To illustrate the similarities 
and differences between the two methods, a theoretical comparison was also introduced to this 
chapter. The next chapter explains how the methods will be applied and eventually compared to 
each other. 
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4 Methodology 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, SQUARE and SREBP could be the potential solutions for 
the existing problems in the security requirements elicitation domain. Therefore, in this thesis, 
the author is going to compare these two methods by applying both of them to the case study of 
the EFA to examine which method can address such problems more effectively. In this chapter, 
the research question to be examined in the empirical analysis is explained together with a brief 
overview of EFA. Secondly, the ISSRM domain model will be explained as the methodological 
framework to standardize the results of the application of the two methods. Subsequently a 
detailed explanation of the design of the empirical study will be presented. Lastly, the Value 
Chain and an example of the Operational Business Processes will be presented to represent the 
input used for the application of the two methods in the following chapter. 
4.1 Research Question and Case Description 
 
Research Question 
In this thesis, the following research question will be examined to compare the two potential 
solutions to the issues at stake:  
RQ: Which security requirements elicitation method, SQUARE or SREBP, helps to identify a 
more complete list of security requirements? 
To answer this research question, the author applies the two methods to one case study. The 
completeness of the security requirements will be compared with regard to the percentage of the 
coverage provided by the two methods. As mentioned above, the EFA is chosen as the basis for 
the cases study. 
To gather information about the EFA, interviews with a senior-level employee of the EFA were 
conducted. The interviews were carried out face to face in a semi-structured format with the 
Director-General of the EFA. The interview period ranged from October 2013 to May 2014. 
Each session lasted from 30 minutes to 2 hours. During the interviews it was determined that due 
to the organizational specifics of the EFA, namely their heavy reliance on a single information 
management system, that the application of the security requirements elicitation methods will be 
carried out on the utilization of that information management system.  
Case Description 
The Estonian Football Association (EFA) is a non-governmental organization that oversees the 
organization of national leagues and games within Estonia and also interacts with international 
organizations such as FIFA and UEFA for international co-operation when organizing football 
games. They also manage the databases for players, umpires and coaches in Estonia. 
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Structure of the organization: The Estonian Football Association is a small organization, 
employing approximately 30 personnel. The employees work in one office located in Tallinn.  
 IT system: The organization relies heavily on IT systems for their daily operations. The 
backbone of the system is an information management system called ERIS (Electronic 
Registration Information System). The system is a custom designed platform which allows for 
managing different databases (player database, team database etc.) as well as for publishing 
information to the association’s public website. ERIS can only be accessed within the office 
from the local area network. VPN access for the system does exist, but this is only available to 
the company which designed the system and which performs maintenance and monthly backups 
of the databases. 
External access to the ERIS is also supported in limited form to allow team representatives and 
umpires to modify their team entries and fill in match reports respectively. Authentication for the 
umpires and team representatives is carried out using the Estonian national ID card 
authentication.  
Office staff use employer provided laptops running Windows XP. Staff’s personal computers 
cannot connect to the local network and office laptops are to remain in the office at all times. The 
association also has a public website which is hosted elsewhere. 
Security: The Estonian Football Association currently does not have any IT security policies in 
place and the overall security awareness is limited among the employees. One IT specialist is on 
site every day to deal with any issues that the employees may have. The association experienced 
targeted cyber attacks in 2005 aimed at trying to access player information in the database. As a 
result, the protection of personal information is considered a priority (Interview with EFA 
Director General). 
4.2 Design of the Empirical Study 
 
In the previous sections, the research goal and the description of the case were presented along 
with a description of how the ISSRM domain model is used as the methodological framework to 
standardize the results of the security requirements elicitation. Subsequently this section aims to 
explain in detail how the previously described aspects are brought together in the empirical 
study. 
Figure 5 illustrates how the research question is answered in this thesis. Firstly the author 
examined the different methods in the Security Engineering domain to identify specific 
problems. From relevant literature, it was determined that two potential solutions exist to this 
problem. In light of this, the research question was developed and it was determined that an 
empirical comparison of the two methods should be carried out to determine which method 
provides a better solution to the problem. The methods, SQUARE and SREBP, are applied to 
EFA case study to elicit security requirements. In order to answer the research question, the 
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security requirements are then compared using comparison criteria to determine which method 
produced a more complete set of security requirements. 
4.4 Value Chain and Business Process Models of the EFA 
 
To carry out the empirical study and the application of the security requirements methods 
described in the previous section, the Value Chain and Business Process models of the EFA are 
used as the inputs. These models were elicited based on the information gathered from the 
interviews with the EFA. The Director-General of the EFA was consulted throughout the 
development of these models to ensure their accuracy. For the purposes of this empirical study, 
no security solutions were modeled. 
 
 
Figure 5: Design of the Empirical Study 
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Figure 6: Value Chain of the EFA 
Figure 6 presents the Value Chain of the EFA, listing business processes that bring value to the 
organization. The value chain process starts with the Register Team, to register a new team with 
the EFA, and Register Umpire, to register a new umpire with the EFA, processes starting in 
parallel. Once the team has been registered, the Register Player process can be started in which a 
player is able to register themselves with the EFA as part of the team. Once teams, players and 
umpires have registered, the Timetabling process starts to elicit a timetable for assigning teams 
and umpires to different games. Once the games have taken place, the game reports are 
registered in the Game report registration process.  
 
Figure 7: Business assets and their attributes  
Figure 7 presents the Business assets derived from each of the processes in the value chain. Each asset 
also has their attributes listed; these were derived from the operational business process models. Each of 
these processes was elaborated in more detail, an example of this is shown in Figure 8 based on the 
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Register Team business process. The rest of the business process models of the EFA are in the Appendix, 
section A1. 
 
 
Figure 8: Register Team Operational Business Process model 
In Figure 8, the Team representative and the EFA employee are represented as swimlanes, the same is the 
case with the information system, ERIS. The Register Team process starts with the Team Rep submitting 
a paper application to register a new team. This application is received by the EFA employee who then 
verifies the validity of the application. If the application is not valid, it is sent back to the Team Rep for 
review. Once the application has been accepted, a new Team is created in ERIS by the EFA employee. 
ERIS receives the request to create a new entry and does so. The new Team entry is saved in the Team 
database. The Team info, inputted by the EFA employee when creating the new Team, is saved in the 
newly created Team data file. A notification is sent to the EFA employee once this is completed. The 
Team info also contained information about the Team rep, who will have access to the Team information 
through ERIS. ERIS creates a new entry for the Team rep and a notification is sent to the EFA employee 
and the Team rep. Once this process is completed, ERIS automatically publishes Team’s information on 
the EFA website. 
4.5 Summary 
Chapter 4 presented the research question and the overall research design, explaining in detail how the 
research question would be answered using the EFA as the basis of a case study. SQUARE and SREBP 
would be applied to the case study and the elicited security requirements would be compared to determine 
their completeness of coverage. The next section gives an overview of how exactly SQUARE and SREBP 
were applied. 
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5 Empirical Study: Application of SQUARE and SREBP 
 
This chapter conducts the application SQUARE and SREBP according to the design 
specifications in the previous chapter. SQUARE and SREBP are applied to the case study of the 
EFA to elicit security requirements. Firstly SQUARE is applied and a summary of the security 
requirements elicited is shown. Subsequently, SREBP is applied and the elicited security 
requirements are displayed. Lastly, the comparative summary of these two applications is briefly 
presented. 
5.1 Application of SQUARE 
 
This section covers the application of the SQUARE methodology outlined in Mead et al (2005). 
The individual steps of this application of the SQUARE method are outlined here, with the 
elicited security requirements listed in Appendix Section A3. The security requirements elicited 
using this method are further analyzed in Chapter 6. As the input for this application of 
SQUARE, the Value Chain and business operational models of the EFA are used. 
5.1.1 Agree on Definitions 
 
The first step in the SQUARE process is agreeing upon the definitions that will be used for the 
subsequent steps. For this step, the contribution of both the security engineers and the 
stakeholders is required. In this case, the author of the paper and an executive member of the 
EFA discussed the definitions. 
Output: The stakeholders relied on the discretion of the author of the thesis to choose the 
appropriate definitions. As a result, the along with the concepts and terms presented with ISSRM 
were chosen. Examples of the definitions adapted from ISSRM are presented according to 
Dubois et al, (2010). Threat- A potential attack, carried out by a threat agent that targets one or 
more IS assets and may lead to harm to those assets. It is constituted of a threat agent and an 
attack method. Threat agent- An actor that can potentially harm the IS. Constitutes a threat when 
combined with an attack method. Vulnerability - A characteristic of the IS asset that constitutes a 
weakness or a flaw. Risk - The combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities that can 
lead to a negative impact that harms the assets. Asset - Anything that has value to the 
organization in terms of achieving its objectives. 
5.1.2 Identify Business and Security Goals 
 
The second SQUARE step is the definition of security and business goals. The goals were 
initially presented by an executive member of the Estonian Football Association and were 
elaborated to ensure their applicability in the context of security requirements elicitation. For 
example, the goal of ensuring ‘fair play’ was transformed to two security goals: monitoring and 
integrity. 
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Output: The following business goal and security goals were elicited: 
Business goal: Organizing national football championship and champions cup games. 
Security goal 1.Confidentiality: Only authorized persons can access sensitive information stored 
in the databases. Much of the data in these databases is personal information of the players. 
Security goal 2.Integrity: Only authorized persons are allowed to modify any data on the 
information system. This is vital to determine that no foul play is at hand and this is aligned with 
the ‘fair play’ principles. 
Security goal 3.Availability: The data and services should be available at all times. 
Security goal 4.Monitoring: User activities and access attempts should be monitored. This 
contributes to the Confidentiality and Integrity of the assets as monitoring enables active 
protection of the aforementioned criterion. 
Security goal 5.Authentication: User identity must be verified before access is granted to any of 
the services on ERIS, especially those that interact with databases. This also contributes to the 
Integrity of the assets as it prevents unauthorized access to the databases. 
5.1.3 Develop Artifacts 
 
Step three of the SQUARE methodology entails the creation of various artifacts which will be 
used for the risk assessment and security requirements elicitation. In this application of the 
SQUARE method, the Value Chain and the business operational models of the EFA represent 
the artifacts along with the Use case and Misuse case models. 
5.1.4 Perform Risk Assessment and Security Requirements Elicitation 
 
ISSRM was chosen as the method for the risk assessment and security requirements elicitation. 
Section 2.3.1 covered the advantages and features of ISSRM, additionally; using ISSRM within 
the SQUARE process eliminates some of the shortcomings of the SQUARE methodology, 
namely the lack of certain definitions of terms. Using ISSRM also allows for a more objective 
comparison of the security requirements elicited with both methods applied in this thesis as 
SREBP also utilizes the ISSRM approach. 
 
Output: Presented here are the Business Assets (BA), Information System (IS) assets and use 
case models and misuse case models of the first Business Asset within the context of Risk 1.  
The remaining use case models and risk assessments are presented in the Appendix section A3. 
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Table 1: Estonian Football Association Business Assets (IS focus) 
ID Business Asset Description Security 
Criterion 
BA1 Player  Contains the player’s personal information. CIA 
BA2 Team  Contains the team’s information, including 
player names and game dates. 
CIA 
BA3 Umpire  Contains the Umpire’s personal information. CIA 
BA4 Game Contains all the relevant information about 
each game including the game report 
I 
BA5 Timetable Timetable of games taking place. I 
Table 1 lists the business assets elicited from the EFA Value Chain. A description of each of the 
Business Assets is given in the table along with the relevant security criteria. These criteria were 
specified by the EFA. Table 2 lists the IS assets that were elicited from the operational business 
models along with their descriptions. 
Table 2: Estonian Football Association IS assets 
ID IS Asset Description 
IS1 ERIS Information system used by the EFA to 
manage 
IS2 Team and player database Database to store player and team 
information 
IS3 Game database Database to store game entries and 
related information 
IS4 Timetabling software Software used to create timetables and 
schedules. 
IS5 Umpires and coaches database Database to store information and 
entries about coaches and umpires 
 
The relationship between the IS and BAs is denoted with an x in the corresponding cell in the 
traceability matrix Table 3. This denotes which IS assets support the corresponding BAs.  
Table 3: Business assets and IS assets traceability matrix 
 IS assets 
Business 
Asset 
IS1 IS2 IS3 IS4 IS5 
BA1 x x    
BA2 x x    
BA3 x    x 
BA4 x x    
BA5 x   x  
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Implementation of SQUARE: Based on the information gathered in the previous steps, the 
security requirements elicitation process will be explained for the first business asset. In this 
particular case, the first BA and second BA are both stored in their respective databases in the 
same way, as a result, the first risks identified apply to both BAs. During the security 
requirements elicitation process, it became apparent that this was also the case with other 
business assets.  Figure 9 shows the use case model for Business Assets 1 and 2. The next step in 
the process calls for identifying threats and threat agents, this is illustrated using misuse cases in 
Figure 10. Based on the misuse cases model, the ISSRM methodology is applied to elicit security 
requirements, an example of this is given below based on Risk 1: 
Initially the BA and IS are identified as the Team and the Team database respectively. This is 
followed by identifying a potential Threat Agent, the Hacker, and a potential Attack Method as 
hacking. The Threat Agent and the Attack Method are combined to form the Threat, which is 
that the hacker is able to hack into the database. To do this, the hacker exploits a Vulnerability: 
user permissions are not checked when data is accessed. This causes the Event: Hacker hacks 
into the database due to user permissions not being checked when data is accessed. The Impact 
of this Event is that there will be a loss of confidentiality of the BA. Combining the Impact and 
the Event, the following Risk is identified: Hacker hacks into the database thus negating the 
confidentiality of the data. To mitigate this, it is necessary to implement a Security requirement: 
Only authorized personnel should be able to access the database. User credentials must be 
checked. Finally, a suggested Control to satisfy the Security requirement is the implementation 
of the Estonian national ID card authentication software for authorizing users to access the 
database. 
One use case diagram can be used to identify more than one risk and therefore more than one 
security requirement as both of the risks shown in Table 4 and Table 5 are derived from the 
misuse cases diagram in Figure 10. The control and control cost were elicited through 
discussions with stakeholders and present potential controls to the security requirements.  
 
Figure 9: Use cases diagram for BA1 and BA2 
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Figure 10: Misuse cases diagram for BA1 and BA2 – Hacking and unauthorized access 
Table 4: Hacker accessing and modifying the Team and player database 
Business asset Player 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R1 
IS Asset Team and player database 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the Player’s personal information. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker hacks into the database thus negating the confidentiality of 
the data. 
Impact Loss of confidentiality of the business asset. 
Event Hacker hacks into the database due to user permissions not being 
checked when data is accessed 
Vulnerability User permissions are not checked when data is accessed. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to hack into the database 
Attack method Hacking the Team and player database 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Only authorized personnel should be able to access the database. 
User credentials must be checked 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ1 
Control Implementation of Estonian national ID card authentication 
software 
Cost of control 500 EUR 
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Table 5: Hacker hacks into the Team and player database to manipulate team’s information.  
Business asset  Player, Team 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R2 
IS Asset Team and player Database 
Security criterion Availability and integrity of the team’s information. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker hacks into the database and changes data thus negating the 
availability and integrity of the data. 
Impact Loss of availability and integrity of the business asset. 
Event Hacker hacks into the database and changes the data. 
Vulnerability User permissions are not checked when data is being modified. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker can hack into the database and change data. 
Attack method Hacking the Team and player database 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Authentication should be implemented when data is being 
modified. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ2 
Control Implement authentication software 
Cost of control 0-1000 EUR 
5.1.5 Results of SQUARE application 
 
A number of security requirements were elicited using SQUARE on the EFA case study. The 
security requirements, identified as SRQ are shown below in Figure 11. The security 
requirements highlighted represent duplicate security requirements or architectural constraints 
and are thus not counted. The rest of the security requirements each represent general security 
requirements which were then applied to each BA where applicable.  
Table 6 lists the breakdown of the number of security requirements applicable to each of the BAs 
identified using SQUARE. Table 4 lists the breakdown of the security requirements between the 
various Business Assets. The security requirements are listed in more detail in the Appendix, 
section A3 
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Figure 11 – SQUARE Security Requirements. 
Table 6: SQUARE Security Requirements assigned to Business Assets 
Business Asset Security Requirements Number of SRQ 
BA1 - Player SRQ1.1, SRQ2.1, SRQ3.1, SRQ4.1, SRQ5, 
SRQ6.1, SRQ7.1, SRQ8.1, SRQ10.1, SRQ11.1, 
SRQ12, SRQ13.1, SRQ14 
13 
BA2 - Team SRQ1.2, SRQ2.2, SRQ3.2, SRQ4.2, SRQ5, 
SRQ6.2, SRQ7.2, SRQ8.2, SRQ10.2, SRQ11.2, 
SRQ12, SRQ13.2, SRQ14 
 
13 
BA3 - Umpire SRQ1.3, SRQ2.3, SRQ3.3, SRQ4.3, SRQ5, 
SRQ6.3, SRQ7.3, SRQ8.3, SRQ10.3, SRQ11.3, 
SRQ12, SRQ13.3, SRQ14 
13 
BA4 - Game SRQ1.4, SRQ2.4, SRQ3.4, SRQ4.4, SRQ5, 
SRQ6.4,SRQ7.4, SRQ8.4, SRQ10.4, SRQ11.4, 
SRQ12, SRQ13.4, SRQ14 
13 
BA5 - 
Timetable 
SRQ1.5, SRQ2.5, SRQ3.5, SRQ4.5, SRQ5, 
SRQ6.5, SRQ7.5, SRQ8.5, SRQ9, SRQ10.5, 
SRQ11.5, SRQ12, SRQ13.5,SRQ14 
14 
Total number of 
security 
requirements: 
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SRQ ID Description New SRQ ID
1 Only authorized personnel should be able to access the database. User credentials must be checked 1
2 Authentication should be implemented when data is being modified. 2
3 An access control list (ACL) should be implemented 3
4 Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation should be implemented. 4
5 social engineering training for employees should be implemented 5
6 ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented 6
7 Data stored in the database should be encrypted 7
8 The entries in the database should be audited regularly. 8
9 Data stored in the database should be encrypted
10 Only authorized personnel should be able to access the database. User credentials must be checked
11 Authentication should be implemented when data is being modified.
12 Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation has to be implemented
13 An access control list (ACL) should be implemented
14 Implement social engineering training for employees
15 ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented
16 The entries in the database should be audited regularly.
17 The output of the software should be compared to the input. 9
18 Data in the database should only be modifiable through ERIS after proper authentication. 10
19 Regular backups of the databases should be introduced. 11
20 Any and all data exchange between the user and the server should be encrypted 12
21 Implement monitoring software to notify the administrator of any suspicious access/file modifications. 13
22 Antivirus software should be installed on all workstations 14
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5.2 Application of SREBP 
 
This section covers the application of the SREBP method based on an example one operational 
business process from the case study. The Register Team business process will be used to 
illustrate the application of the method. The application of the SREBP method was carried out 
following the guidelines presented in Ahmed & Matulevičius, (2014b). The general instructions 
for each step are also shown in this chapter in the context of the first business asset. 
5.2.1 Business Assets identification and determination of Security Objectives 
Before security requirements elicitation, it is necessary to gather information about the 
organizational processes. The Value Chain of the EFA is used for this. The Value Chain displays 
the business processes which create value for the EFA and which utilize the information 
management system. The first step of the SREBP method is the identification of Business Assets. 
Accordingly, a number of Business Assets were identified from the EFA Value Chain; these are 
listed below. For each of the assets, their confidentiality, availability and integrity were 
considered as security objectives: 
Team – Team registration 
Player – Player registration 
Umpire – Umpire registration 
Timetable – Timetabling 
Game – Game report registration 
Each Business Asset identified consists of attributes which were elicited from the operational 
business models.  
5.2.2 Security Requirements elicitation based on Register Team process 
The second stage of the SREBP method is the security requirements elicitation. This is based on 
five contextual areas: access control, communication channel, input interfaces, network 
infrastructure and data store. These contextual areas are described in more detail in section 4.2.1.  
5.2.2.1 Access control is the first contextual area for security requirement elicitation in SREBP. 
In the Team Registration process, the Team represents the business asset which must be 
protected, especially when it is manipulated by the IS asset, ERIS. An example of a threat is 
when the attributes of the Team such as Team info, are provided to the users without checking 
their access credentials. To mitigate this risk, the SREBP methodology utilizes access control 
mechanisms, such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) and provides guidelines to elicit an 
RBAC model for security requirements elicitation. For this, the following steps must be 
performed: 
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Identifying resources: The business asset, The Team, is defined as a resource that needs to be 
protected in the Register Team example. The attributes of the Team business asset in the Register 
Team process are Team info and Team rep.  
Identifying roles: The swimlanes in the operational business models represent the roles in the 
context of the RBAC model. In the case of the Register Team example, the Team rep and the 
Football Association employee are represented using the <<role>> stereotype in the RBAC 
model as they can both access the protected resource. ERIS is not included in the role stereotype 
as it is an information system through which the other two roles, Team Rep and Football 
Association Employee, are able to access the protected resource. 
Assigning users: Roles are assigned to users, however in most cases it is not possible to elicit 
specific users from the operational business process. 
Identifying secured operations: Operations are actions that can interact and change the state of 
the protected resource. In the Register Team example, these are Create Team, register Team info, 
assign Team rep etc. Usually, these operations are business activities from the operational 
business process that accesses the business resource. 
Assigning permissions: Permissions are privileges given to roles that specify which operations 
the specified role is allowed to carry out on the protected resource. There are three categories of 
operations for which permissions are given, Create, Read and Update. In the Register Team 
example, Football Association employee can create the resource Team.  
Using these steps, an RBAC model can be developed, for the Register Team example; to elicit 
security requirements as depicted in Figure 11. The model shows what the authorized parties are 
allowed to do vis-à-vis the protected resource. The RBAC model does not capture certain 
scenarios such as entailment constraints, delegation constraints and usage control. The assistance 
of business analysts and security analysts is usually needed to determine these requirements 
(Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014b). 
Figure 12 displays the RBAC model for the team registration process. From this model a number 
of security requirements can be elicited: 
SRQ1: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Team 
SRQ2: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the Team info and Team rep. 
SRQ3: Team representative should be able to: Read the Team info and Team rep. 
SRQ4: Permission Access to Team received: READ should be given only to one user assigned to 
Team Rep. This user also receives permission Update Team info: UPDATE. 
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Figure 12: RBAC security model – Team registration business process 
SRQ1 and SRQ 2 are elicited straight from the RBAC model, whereas RQ4 was elicited based 
on other considerations (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014b). 
5.2.2.2 Communication Channel is the second contextual area used for requirements elicitation. 
This contextual area deals with data exchange between the business partners and the system over 
untrusted networks such as the internet. Keeping the data confidentiality and integrity are the 
main goals for this stage. In the Team Registration example, most of the processes happen within 
a secured local network, however when the Team Rep proceeds to Manage Team, the system is 
accessed externally and must be secured within this contextual area. To mitigate the potential 
risks, the following must be done: 
 
Identification of communicators: It is necessary to determine which entities transmit or receive 
data. Using the business process model, it is possible to identify the information system used by 
the enterprise and the business partners that are communicated with. This is illustrated in Figure 
13. In this figure, ERIS is shown to be the information system of the Football Association and 
the Football association Employee acts as the business partner. 
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Figure 13: TLS protocol implementation 
Identifying data transmission: It is necessary to identify the relevant data (e.g. business asset) 
being transferred between the communicators over an untrusted communication channel such as 
the Internet. In the Register Team example, Team info is communicated to ERIS and thus needs 
to be protected. 
Following these two steps, the following security requirements are elicited: 
SRQ5: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public and private keys) 
certified by a certification authority. 
SRQ6: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the Team info (and notification 
messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
TLS or SSL protocols can be used to satisfy the security requirements. As illustrated in Figure 
12, the client first sends a handshake message with a random number, the server replies with its 
certificate/public key and information about the certification authority. After the certificate has 
been confirmed by the client, they send a generated secret to the server which decrypts it with its 
private key and generates symmetric session keys which enable a secure data exchange session 
to be established (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014b). 
5.2.2.3 Input interface is the third contextual area that is considered for requirements elicitation 
within SREBP. Input interfaces are used to input data that is then submitted by the business 
partners for example by the Team Rep. Input interfaces ensures that the data submitted by 
business partners is correct. To help with the security requirements elicitation in this contextual 
area, the following should be done: 
Identifying input interfaces: Input interfaces can be determined from the operational business 
process by looking at incoming message flows. Input to the information system from the 
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business partners comprises input interfaces. Within the example of the team registration process 
the operations Enter Team information and Manage Team utilize input interfaces. 
Identifying input data: Input data is the data received by the input interfaces from the business 
enterprises. Certain threats must also be considered in the context of input interfaces; malicious 
scripts can be submitted by threat agents (SSL injections, xpath injections etc.) which would 
compromise the integrity, availability of any further activities following the use of the input 
interfaces (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014b). Following the two steps outlined above and taking 
into account these considerations the following security requirements are elicited: 
SRQ7:Create Team interface should filter Team info. 
SRQ8: Create Team interface should sanitize the Team info to transform it to the required format 
SRQ9: Create Team interface should canonicalize the Team info to verify it against its canonical 
representation. (Clarke et al 2012). 
SRQ8 and SRQ9 are based on countermeasures suggested in Clarke et al 2008 for the most 
common SQL injection attacks. 
5.2.2.4 Network infrastructure covers the protection of the network infrastructure in which 
business operations are carried out within the enterprise. This entails the enterprise being able to 
offer business services to the partner. As the Estonian Football Association is a small 
organisation, the most suitable solution for its network security needs would most likely be the 
stateful multilayer inspection firewall as it combines aspects from other firewalls. As a result, the 
following security requirements are elicited. 
 
 
Figure 14: Firewall architecture 
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SRQ10: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business partners such as 
Football Association employee. 
SRQ11: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Create 
Team, to determine the validity of the Team info received from the Football Association 
employee 
SRQ12: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football Association 
employee’s requests for additional conditions of established communication. 
SRQ13: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until these ports are explicitly 
opened. 
 
In most cases, the communication between the server and the business partners is bidirectional 
and similar security requirements must be taken into account when information is sent back from 
the server to the business partners. In the Register Team process, the server is assumed to be 
trusted and no requirements are thus elicited. 
5.2.2.5 Data Store is the last contextual area examined within the framework of SREBP for 
security requirements elicitation, covering how data is stored and handled in the associated 
databases. Data confidentiality and integrity would be compromised if the threat agent were to 
get access to the data. There are several approaches to ensure that data remains protected, for 
example implementing encryption of the data itself. To facilitate the elicitation of security 
requirements, an RBAC model is used. The model is developed using the following steps: 
Identifying datastore resource: In this contextual area, the datastore is identified as a singular 
entity. The business assets and relevant data are modeled as the resource attributes for the 
datastore. In the Register Team example, the attributes Team, Team info and Team rep are 
actually attributes of the business asset Team. 
Identifying datastore’s operations: In this contextual area, it is necessary to identify which 
operations save or retrieve data from the datastore. These operations are modeled as the 
operations of the datastore in the RBAC model. 
Following these two steps, the roles and permissions are assigned using the methods described in 
the access control contextual area. The resulting RBAC model based on the Register Team 
example is shown in Figure 15.    As a result of these considerations, the following security 
requirements are elicited: 
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 Figure 15: RBAC Security Model – Data Store 
 
SRQ14: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Team, Team info and Team rep to 
the Team Database. 
SRQ15: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Team when it is stored in the Team Database. 
SRQ16: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Team info when it is stored in the Team 
Database. 
SRQ17: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Team rep when it is stored in the Team 
Database. 
 
SRQ14 entails monitoring and recording the events when the resource attributes are stored in the 
database. This allows for determining who performed what operations on which data at what 
time. 
SRQ 15-17 require the implementation of a solution such as cryptographic algorithms. Even if 
physical access to the data store is gained by the attacker, they would not be able to violate the 
confidentiality of the data stored there. 
5.2.3 Results of SREBP application  
 
A number of security requirements were elicited using SREBP. The security requirements are 
listed in Table 7, assigned to their respective Business Assets. These security requirements are 
listed in more detail in the Appendix section A2. 
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Table 7: SREBP Security Requirements assigned to Business Assets 
Business 
Asset 
Security Requirements Number 
of SRQ 
Player              SRQBA1:1 SRQBA1:2 SRQBA1:3 SRQBA1:4
 SRQBA1:5 SRQBA1:6 SRQBA1:7 SRQBA1:8
 SRQBA1:9 SRQBA1:10 SRQBA1:11 SRQBA1:12
 SRQBA1:13 SRQBA1:14 SRQBA1:15 SRQBA1:16
 SRQBA1:17 SRQBA1:18 
18 
Team              SRQBA2:1 SRQBA2:2 SRQBA2:3 SRQBA2:4
 SRQBA2:5 SRQBA2:6 SRQBA2:7 SRQBA2:8
 SRQBA2:9 SRQBA2:10 SRQBA2:11 SRQBA2:12
 SRQBA2:13 SRQBA2:14 SRQBA2:15 SRQBA2:16
 SRQBA2:17 SRQBA2:18 SRQBA2:19 SRQBA2:20
 SRQBA2:21 SRQBA2:22 SRQBA2:23 SRQBA2:24
 SRQBA2:25 SRQBA2:26 SRQBA2:27 SRQBA2:28
 SRQBA2:29 SRQBA2:30 SRQBA2:31 SRQBA2:32 
32 
Umpire              SRQBA3:1 SRQBA3:2 SRQBA3:3 SRQBA3:4
 SRQBA3:5 SRQBA3:6 SRQBA3:7 SRQBA3:8
 SRQBA3:9 SRQBA3:10 SRQBA3:11 SRQBA3:12
 SRQBA3:13 SRQBA3:14 SRQBA3:15 SRQBA3:16
 SRQBA3:17 SRQBA3:18 SRQBA3:19 SRQBA3:20
 SRQBA3:21 SRQBA3:22 SRQBA3:23 SRQBA3:24
 SRQBA3:25 
25 
Game              SRQBA4:1 SRQBA4:2 SRQBA4:3 SRQBA4:4
 SRQBA4:5 SRQBA4:6 SRQBA4:7 SRQBA4:8
 SRQBA4:9 SRQBA4:10 SRQBA4:11 SRQBA4:12
 SRQBA4:13 SRQBA4:14 SRQBA4:15 SRQBA4:16
 SRQBA4:17 SRQBA4:18 SRQBA4:19 SRQBA4:20
 SRQBA4:21 SRQBA4:22 SRQBA4:23 SRQBA4:24
 SRQBA4:25 SRQBA4:26 SRQBA4:27 SRQBA4:28
 SRQBA4:29 
29 
Timetable              SRQBA5:1 SRQBA5:2 SRQBA5:3 SRQBA5:4
 SRQBA5:5 SRQBA5:6 SRQBA5:7 SRQBA5:8
 SRQBA5:9 SRQBA5:10 SRQBA5:11 SRQBA5:12
 SRQBA5:13 SRQBA5:14 SRQBA5:15 SRQBA5:16
 SRQBA5:17 SRQBA5:18 SRQBA5:19 SRQBA5:20
 SRQBA5:21 SRQBA5:22 
22 
Total number 
of security 
requirements: 
126 
 
5.3 Summary 
 
To sum up, the application of SQUARE resulted in the elicitation of 66 security requirements. 
On the other hand, the application of SREBP resulted in the elicitation of 126 security 
requirements; a significantly larger number. A further analysis of the differences between the 
two results is conducted in the next chapter to determine the completeness of coverage of the 
security requirements in order to answer the research question of this thesis. 
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6 Results and Validity 
This chapter analyses the outcomes of the empirical study that was conducted in the previous 
chapter. Firstly the result and validity of the empirical study are scrutinized in detail to find the 
answer to the research question, to do so, the author categorizes and evaluates the coverage of 
the security requirements. Finally, threats to the validity of the findings are covered. 
6.1 Evaluation of the Coverage of the Security Requirements 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the comparison criteria and the method for comparing 
completeness, developed in by Ahmed (2014), will be used to compare the results of the 
empirical study. In (Ahmed, 2014) eight generic security categories are chosen and used as a 
baseline to see to what extent the security requirements satisfy the security criterion of these 
eight categories. These categories are as follows: 
 Identification – security requirements that connect an individual or an application to a 
unique identity before it interacts with the information system. 
 Authentication – security requirements that recognize and validate the user’s identity 
before interacting with the information system. 
 Authorization – security requirements that characterize the role or the user authorized to 
access business assets or related data within the information system. 
 Accounting – security requirements to record security related events or actions and make 
this info accessible at a later point. 
 Audit – security requirements to analyze the security actions captured by accounting 
security requirements and to then compare them against a rule set to determine whether 
security violations occurred. 
 Non-repudiation - security requirements that record evidence of the users who have 
participated in an activity to provide proof of their involvement later on. 
 Immunity – security requirements that specify the ability of an information system to 
resist unauthorized access or attacks from viruses 
 Data exchange – security requirements that protect the confidentiality of data from 
unauthorized access during transmission over unsecured mediums such as the internet. 
This method considers the security requirements to have 100% coverage if all the security 
criterion of each category have been met. These criteria are Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability. However not all categories consider all three criteria. For example, for the non-
repudiation category, only the Integrity of the data is important. Each category contributes 12.5% 
of the complete coverage. A 5 stage scale, from 0% to 100%, increasing in 25% increments is 
used to measure the completeness of coverage in each category. 0% coverage means that none of 
the security requirements meet the security criterion of that category whereas 100% coverage 
means that the security requirements satisfy all of the relevant security criteria of that category 
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for that business asset. Additionally security requirements can satisfy more than one criterion for 
each category and some requirements are applicable to more than one category, an example of 
this is SRQBA2:10 which covers a number of different categories. 
To illustrate this, an example based on the Team business asset is shown in Table 8. Based on the 
Team business asset, the application of SREBP yielded security requirements that provided 
81.3% coverage, whereas the security requirements elicited using SQUARE only yielded 45.87% 
coverage. The rest of the tables with the application results for each business asset can be found 
in the Appendix section A3.  
The overall completeness comparison of the security requirements elicited using SQUARE and 
SREBP is presented in Table 9. To sum up, it is apparent from the results that for every business 
asset, SREBP security requirements provide significantly more coverage. The difference of 
coverage of SQUARE and SREBP ranges from 31.25% with security requirements elicited for 
the Timetable business asset to 39% for the Umpire business asset. Based on this data the 
research question can be answered: it is clear that SREBP allows for the elicitation of a more 
complete set of security requirements for the Estonian Football Association compared to 
SQUARE. 
6.2 Threats to Validity 
 
Although the empirical study of this thesis presents the thorough comparative analysis of 
SQUARE and SREBP, the author admits certain limitations in its validity.. The main threat to 
validity of this study lies with the author’s limited experience of implementing both SREBP and 
SQUARE. The research presented in this thesis represents the first time the author has had to 
apply either method to a real case study. Additionally, the Estonian Football Association did not 
have its business processes modeled and as a result, there may be discrepancies between the 
operational business models presented in this study and the actual business operations of the 
organization. Another potentially limiting factor is the order in which the security requirements 
elicitations were carried out. By the time the author carried out the second security requirements 
elicitation, a certain familiarity with the topic had already been developed.   
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Table 8: Completeness of Business Asset Team related security requirements 
 
 
 
Asset: Team
Requirements 
Categorization 
1.      Identification C 6.25 SRQBA2:4 75% 4.69 C 6.25 SRQ1.2 50%      3.13    
I 6.25 SRQBA2:4 75% 4.69 I 6.25 0%           -      
A - A -
2.      Authentication
C 4.17 SRQBA2:4, SRQBA2:5, SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, 
SRQBA2:12, SRQBA2:27, SRQBA2:28, SRQBA2:29 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.2, SRQ 
3.2 75%      3.13    
I 4.17 SRQBA2:4, SRQBA2:5, SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, 
SRQBA2:12, SRQBA2:27, SRQBA2:28, SRQBA2:29 100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.2
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA2:5, SRQBA2:10 100% 4.17 A 4.17 SRQ2.2 50% 2.09
3.      Authorization 
C 4.17 SRQBA2:1, SRQBA2:2, SRQBA2:3, SRQBA2:4, 
SRQBA2:18, SRQBA2:19, SRQBA2:20, SRQBA2:21 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.2, 
SRQ3.2 100%      4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA2:1, SRQBA2:2, SRQBA2:3, SRQBA2:4, 
SRQBA2:18, SRQBA2:19, SRQBA2:20, SRQBA2:21 100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.2
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA2:10
SRQBA2:13
50% 2.085
A 4.17 SRQ6.2,  
SRQ2.2
25% 1.04
4.      Accounting 
C 4.17 SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, SRQBA2:12, 
SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:27, SRQBA2:28, SRQBA2:29 75% 3.128
C 4.17 SRQ8.2, 
SRQ13.2 100%      4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, SRQBA2:12, 
SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:27, SRQBA2:28, SRQBA2:29 75% 3.128
I 4.17 SRQ8.2, 
SRQ13.2 100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, SRQBA2:12, 
SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:27, SRQBA2:28, SRQBA2:29 75% 3.128
A 4.17 SRQ13.2
75% 3.13
5.      Audit
C 4.17 SRQBA2:14, SRQBA2:30
75% 3.128
C 4.17
0%           -      
I 4.17 SRQBA2:14, SRQBA2:30
75% 3.128
I 4.17 SRQ13.2
25% 1.04
A 4.17 SRQBA2:14, SRQBA2:30
75% 3.128
A 4.17
0% 0.00
6.      Non repudiation C - C -
I 12.5 SRQBA2:14, SRQBA2:30
75% 9.375
I 12.5
0% 0.00
A - A -
7.      Immunity
C 4.17 SRQBA2:6, SRQBA2:7, SRQBA2:8, SRQBA2:9, 
SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, SRQBA2:12, 
SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:15, SRQBA2:16, 
SRQBA2:17, SRQBA2:18, SRQBA2:22, 
SRQBA2:23, SRQBA2:24, SRQBA2:25, 
SRQBA2:26, SRQBA2:27,   SRQBA2:28, 
SRQBA2:29, SRQBA2:31, SRQBA2:32
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ4.2, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
I 4.17 6, SRQBA2:7, SRQBA2:8, SRQBA2:9, 
SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, SRQBA2:12, 
SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:15, SRQBA2:16, 
SRQBA2:17, SRQBA2:18, SRQBA2:22, 
SRQBA2:23, SRQBA2:24, SRQBA2:25, 
SRQBA2:26, SRQBA2:27,   SRQBA2:28, 
SRQBA2:29, SRQBA2:31, SRQBA2:32
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ4.2, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
A 4.17 SRQBA2:6, SRQBA2:7, SRQBA2:8, SRQBA2:9, 
SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, SRQBA2:12, 
SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:15, SRQBA2:16, 
SRQBA2:17, SRQBA2:18, SRQBA2:22, 
SRQBA2:23, SRQBA2:24, SRQBA2:25, 
SRQBA2:26, SRQBA2:27,   SRQBA2:28, 
SRQBA2:29, SRQBA2:31, SRQBA2:32
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ4.2, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
8.      Data Exchange
C 4.17 SRQBA2:5, SRQBA2:6, SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, 
SRQBA2:12, SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:22, 
SRQBA2:23, SRQBA2:27, SRQBA2:28, SRQBA2:29
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
I 4.17 SRQBA2:5, SRQBA2:6, SRQBA2:10, SRQBA2:11, 
SRQBA2:12, SRQBA2:13, SRQBA2:22, 
SRQBA2:23, SRQBA2:27, SRQBA2:28, SRQBA2:29
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
A 4.17
0% 0
A 4.17 SRQ6.2, 
SRQ12
50% 2.09
Coverage % 81.30 45.87
Requirements (SREBP) Requirements (SQUARE)Coverage Coverage
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Table 9: Overall completeness comparison of SQUARE and SREBP 
 
6.3 Summary 
Chapter 6 introduced the criteria used for comparing the security requirements elicited as a result 
of the empirical study illustrated in Chapter 5.  Subsequently, it carried out comparative analysis 
of the requirement engineering process of SQUARE and SREBP. Consequently, such 
comparison showed that SREBP security requirements provide better coverage than SQUARE 
security requirements. In the next chapter, the study is concluded; the limitations of the thesis, 
findings and potential future work are explained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n
A
u
th
e
n
ti
ca
ti
o
n
A
u
th
o
ri
za
ti
o
n
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
A
u
d
it
N
o
n
-
re
p
u
d
ia
ti
o
n
Im
m
u
n
it
y
D
a
ta
 e
x
ch
a
n
g
e
T
O
T
A
L
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n
A
u
th
e
n
ti
ca
ti
o
n
A
u
th
o
ri
za
ti
o
n
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
A
u
d
it
N
o
n
-
re
p
u
d
ia
ti
o
n
Im
m
u
n
it
y
D
a
ta
 e
x
ch
a
n
g
e
T
O
T
A
L
12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 100 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 100
Reqs. 2 12 12 15 3 1 30 12 87 1 4 5 5 1 0 6 4 26 61
%age 75% 100% 75% 75% 75% 75% 100% 67% 80% 25% 58% 58% 92% 8% 0% 75% 50% 46% 34%
Coverage 9.38 12.50 9.38 9.38 9.38 9.38 12.50 8.33 80.21 3.13 7.29 7.29 11.46 1.04 0.00 9.38 6.25 45.83 34.375
Reqs. 2 18 18 21 6 2 66 22 155 1 4 5 5 1 0 6 4 26 129
%age 75% 100% 83% 75% 75% 75% 100% 67% 81% 25% 58% 58% 92% 8% 0% 75% 50% 46% 35%
Coverage 9.38 12.50 10.42 9.38 9.38 9.38 12.50 8.33 81.25 3.13 7.29 7.29 11.46 1.04 0.00 9.38 6.25 45.83 35.4167
Reqs. 2 12 14 15 6 2 51 22 124 1 4 5 5 1 0 6 4 26 98
%age 75% 100% 83% 100% 75% 75% 100% 67% 84% 25% 58% 58% 92% 8% 0% 75% 50% 46% 39%
Coverage 9.38 12.50 10.42 12.50 9.38 9.38 12.50 8.33 84.38 3.13 7.29 7.29 11.46 1.04 0.00 9.38 6.25 45.83 38.5417
Reqs. 4 24 14 30 3 1 66 24 166 1 4 5 5 0 1 6 4 26 140
%age 75% 100% 83% 100% 75% 75% 100% 67% 84% 25% 58% 58% 92% 0% 25% 75% 50% 48% 36%
Coverage 9.38 12.50 10.42 12.50 9.38 9.38 12.50 8.33 84.38 3.13 7.29 7.29 11.46 0.00 3.13 9.38 6.25 47.92 36.4583
Reqs. 2 20 12 21 3 1 48 18 125 1 4 5 5 2 1 6 4 28 97
%age 75% 100% 67% 100% 75% 75% 100% 67% 82% 25% 58% 58% 92% 25% 25% 75% 50% 51% 31%
Coverage 9.38 12.50 8.33 12.50 9.38 9.38 12.50 8.33 82.29 3.13 7.29 7.29 11.46 3.13 3.13 9.38 6.25 51.04 31.25
%age 75% 100% 78% 90% 75% 75% 100% 67% 83% 25% 58% 58% 92% 10% 10% 75% 50% 47% 35%
Coverage 9.38 12.50 9.79 11.25 9.38 9.38 12.50 8.33 82.50 3.13 7.29 7.29 11.46 1.25 1.25 9.38 6.25 47.29 35.2083
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7 Conclusion 
 
This thesis explored the topic of security requirements elicitation within the Security Engineering 
domain. Several problems in the domain of security requirements elicitation were illustrated and 
SREBP and SQUARE are potential solutions for these problems. 
7.1 Limitations 
 
This thesis has a number of limitations. The primary limitation of this thesis is that the 
applicability of the results of the empirical study is limited by the security elicitation methods 
only being applied to one case study. Further comparisons should be carried out to support the 
findings of this thesis.. The author also recognizes that the inherent differences between 
SQUARE and SREBP may have contributed to the outcome of the empirical study. SQUARE is 
aimed at security analysts and offers additional steps after the security requirements elicitations 
which were not carried out as part of this study. Additionally, SREBP was designed with the use 
of operational business processes in mind whereas using these with SQUARE requires additional 
security domain knowledge. SQUARE also requires more extensive interaction with the 
stakeholders compared to SREBP, something which was not always possible during the 
empirical study portion of this thesis. A certain amount of subjective bias must also be accounted 
for in terms of the models and security requirements elicited; different security analysts may 
come up with slightly different models and security requirements, however the overall picture 
should stay largely the same.  
7.2 Answer to Research Question 
 
In this thesis the following research question was posed: 
RQ: Which security requirements elicitation method, SQUARE or SREBP, helps to identify a 
more complete list of security requirements? 
The research question was answered by carrying out an empirical study on the EFA. SQUARE 
and SREBP were applied to elicit security requirements based on this case study. These security 
requirements were then categorized and their completeness of coverage based on several 
categories was measured. 
The results of the empirical study showed that security requirements elicited using SREBP 
provide, on average 35.2% better coverage than the security requirements elicited using 
SQUARE. In every category, the security requirements elicited using SREBP provided better 
coverage than SQUARE security requirements. The findings of the empirical study allow the 
research question to be answered: SREBP helps identifying a more complete list of security 
requirements. 
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This thesis contributes to the existing research in the security engineering domain by providing 
an empirical analysis of two security requirements elicitation methods. By doing so, the thesis 
adds another empirical analysis of the newly introduced SREBP method which has only been 
applied to one other case study so far. Moreover this study differentiates itself from the previous 
application by applying SQUARE and SREBP on the EFA which did not have any security 
solutions in place and did not have business processes modeled. Despite such a difference, this 
thesis produced results which were in line with previous work. Thereby this thesis contributes to 
the reinforcement of the validity of SREBP. 
7.3 Future Work 
 
For future research, a number of possible avenues of improving both methods exist. For SREBP, 
one possible avenue for future work could be the comparison of SREBP to other business 
process based security requirements elicitation methods. To improve SQUARE, further 
integration with the ISSRM process could be explored for risk assessment and security 
requirements elicitation in order to produce better security requirements. Finally, the option of 
integrating SREBP within SQUARE would probably security requirements with better coverage 
than either method applied individually, therefore the author suggests that this avenue of research 
should be explored in the future. 
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Appendix 
Section A1: EFA value chain and operational business models 
The operational business process models as well as the value chain of the EFA are shown in this 
section. 
 
 
Figure A 1 Football Association Value Chain 
 
Figure A 2 Register Team business process 
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Figure A 3 Register Player business process 
 
Figure A 4 Register Umpire business process 
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Figure A 5 Timetabling business process 
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Figure A 6 Game report registration, Create Game business model 
 
Figure A 7 Game report registration business model 
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Section A 2: SREBP implementation 
 
Register Player 
The following represents the SREBP implementation on the Register Player business process 
 
 
Figure A2 1 Register Player RBAC model 
 
SRQ18: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Player  
SRQ19: : Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the Player info. 
SRQ20: The Player should be able to: Read the Player info. 
SRQ21: The Team rep should be able to Read the Player info. 
SRQ22: Permission Info registered: READ should be given only to one user assigned to The 
Player role. 
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Figure A2 2 TLS/SSL Protocol implementation, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014) 
SRQ23: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public and private keys) 
certified by a certification authority 
SRQ24: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the Player info (and notification 
messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQ25: Create Player interface should filter Player info. 
SRQ26: Create Player interface should sanitize the Player info to transform it to the required 
format 
SRQ27: Create Player interface should canonicalize the Player info to verify it against its 
canonical representation. 
 
 
Figure A2 3 Register Player Business service model 
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SRQ28: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business partners such as 
Football Association employee. 
SRQ29: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Create 
Player, to determine the validity of the Player info received from the Football Association 
employee 
SRQ30: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football Association 
employee’s requests for additional conditions of established communication. 
SRQ31: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until these ports are explicitly 
opened. 
 
In most cases, the communication between the server and the business partners is bidirectional 
and similar security requirements must be taken into account when information is sent back from 
the server to the business partners. In the Register Player process, the server is assumed to be 
trusted and no requirements are thus elicited. 
 
Figure A2 4 Register Player Database RBAC model 
 
SRQ32: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Player and Player info to the Player 
Database. 
SRQ33: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Player when it is stored in the Player 
Database. 
SRQ34: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Player info when it is stored in the Player 
Database. 
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Register Umpire 
The following represents the SREBP implementation on the Register Umpire business process 
 
 
Figure A2 5 Register Umpire RBAC model 
SRQ35: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Umpire . 
SRQ36: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the Umpire info and Umpire 
access. 
SRQ37: Umpire should be able to: Read the Umpire info and Umpire info message. 
SRQ38: Permission Umpire access received: READ should be given only to one user assigned to 
The Umpire role. 
 
Figure A2 6 TLS/SSL Protocol implementation, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014) 
61 
 
SRQ39: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public and private keys) 
certified by a certification authority 
SRQ40: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the Umpire info (and 
notification messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQ41: Create Umpire interface should filter Umpire info. 
SRQ42: Create Umpire interface should sanitize the Umpire info to transform it to the required 
format. 
SRQ43: Create Umpire interface should canonicalize the Umpire info to verify it against its 
canonical representation. 
 
Figure A2 7 Register Umpire Network infrastructure model 
SRQ44: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business partners such as 
Football Association employee. 
SRQ45: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Create 
Umpire, to determine the validity of the Umpire info received from the Football Association 
employee 
SRQ46: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football Association 
employee’s requests for additional conditions of established communication. 
SRQ47: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until these ports are explicitly 
opened. 
 
In most cases, the communication between the server and the business partners is bidirectional 
and similar security requirements must be taken into account when information is sent back from 
the server to the business partners. In the Register Umpire process, the server is assumed to be 
trusted and no requirements are thus elicited. 
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Figure A2 8 Register Umpire Database RBAC model 
SRQ48: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Umpire, Umpire info and Umpire 
access to the Umpire Database. 
SRQ49: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Umpire when it is stored in the Umpire 
Database. 
SRQ50: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Umpire info when it is stored in the Umpire 
Database. 
SRQ51: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Umpire access when it is stored in the Umpire 
Database. 
Timetabling 
The following represents the SREBP implementation on the Timetabling business process 
 
Figure A2 9 Timetabling: Umpire RBAC model 
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Figure A2 10 Timetabling, Team RBAC model 
 
Figure A2 11 Timetabling, Timetable RBAC model 
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SRQ52: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Timetable, Schedule and 
Timetable confirmation. 
SRQ53: Football Association employee: should be able to:  
Read the Timetable info, Schedule and Timetable confirmation. 
SRQ54: Football Association employee should be able to: 
Update the Schedule. 
SRQ55: Team representative should be able to:  
Read the Schedule message. 
SRQ56: Permission Prepare Timetable: CREATE should be given only to one user assigned to 
Football Association employee role. This user also receives the permissions Timetable info 
registered: READ, Create Schedule: CREATE, Schedule created: READ, Verify Schedule: 
READ, Edit Schedule: UPDATE and Confirm Timetable: CREATE. 
SRQ57: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Regions and leagues. 
SRQ58: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the Participation decision and 
Regions and leagues. 
SRQ59: Team rep should be able to: Create the Participation decision. 
SRQ60: Team rep should be able to: Read the Participation decision and Regions and leagues.  
SRQ61: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Assigned games. 
SRQ62: The Umpire: should be able to:  
Read the Assigned games. 
 
 
Figure A2 12 TLS/SSL Protocol implementation, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014) 
 
SRQ63: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public and private keys) 
certified by a certification authority 
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SRQ64: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the Timetable info, Schedule, 
Timetable confirmation, Regions and leagues and Umpire assignments (and notification 
messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQ65: Team rep should encrypt and sign the Participation decision (and notification messages) 
using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQ66: Create Timetable interface should filter Timetable info and Schedule. 
SRQ67: Create Timetable interface should sanitize the Timetable info and Schedule to transform 
it to the required format. 
SRQ68: Create Timetable interface should canonicalize the Timetable info and Schedule to 
verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQ69: Send decision interface should filter Participation decision. 
SRQ70: Send decision interface should sanitize the Participation decision to transform it to the 
required format. 
SRQ71: Send decision interface should canonicalize the Participation decision to verify it against 
its canonical representation. 
SRQ72: Enter Umpire assignments interface should filter Assigned games. 
SRQ73: Enter Umpire assignments interface should sanitize the Assigned games to transform it 
to the required format. 
SRQ74: Enter Umpire assignments interface should canonicalize the Assigned games to verify it 
against its canonical representation. 
 
 
Figure A2 13 Timetabling Network infrastructure model 
SRQ75: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business partners such as 
Football Association employee. 
SRQ76: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Create 
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Timetable, to determine the validity of the Timetable info and Timetable confirmation received 
from the Football Association employee 
SRQ77: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Create 
Schedule, to determine the validity of the Schedule received from the Football Association 
employee. 
SRQ88: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Edit 
Schedule, to determine the validity of the Schedule received from the Football Association 
employee. 
SRQ79: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Confirm 
Timetable, to determine the validity of the Timetable confirmation received from the Football 
Association employee. 
SRQ80: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Assign 
regions and form leagues, to determine the validity of the Regions and leagues received from the 
Football Association employee. 
SRQ81: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Send 
decision, to determine the validity of the Participation decision received from the Team rep. 
 
SRQ82: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football Association 
employee’s requests for additional conditions of established communication. 
SRQ83: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Team rep’s requests for 
additional conditions of established communication. 
SRQ84: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until these ports are explicitly 
opened. 
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Figure A2 14 Timetabling, Team Database RBAC model
 
 
Figure A2 16 Timetabling, Timetable Database RBAC model 
 
SRQ85: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Timetable, Timetable info, 
Schedule and Timetable confirmation in the Timetable Database. 
SRQ86: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Timetable info when it is stored in the 
Timetable Database. 
SRQ87: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Schedule when it is stored in the Timetable 
Database. 
Figure A2 15 Timetabling, Umpire Database RBAC model 
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SRQ88: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Timetable confirmation when it is stored in 
the Timetable Database. 
SRQ89: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Participation decision and Regions 
and leagues in the Team Database. 
SRQ90: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Participation decision when it is stored in the 
Team Database. 
SRQ91: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Regions and leagues when it is stored in the 
Team Database. 
SRQ92: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Assigned games in the Umpire 
Database. 
SRQ93: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Assigned games when it is stored in the 
Umpire Database. 
Game report registration 
The following represents the SREBP implementation on the Game report registration business 
process 
 
Figure A2 17 Game report registration RBAC model 
SRQ94: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Game, Game report, Game 
confirmation,  and Game info. 
SRQ95: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the Game, Game entry, Game 
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confirmation, Game report and Game info. 
SRQ96: Umpire should be able to update the Game report. 
SRQ97: Umpire should be able to read the Game report and Game info. 
SRQ98: Permission Game report registered: READ should be given only to one user assigned to 
Football Association employee role. This user also receives the permissions Verify Game report: 
READ, Amend info in Game report: UPDATE, Confirm Game Report: CREATE and Game 
report confirmed: READ. 
SRQ99: Permission Select Game: READ should be given only to one user assigned to Umpire 
role. This user also receives the permissions Game viewed: READ, Enter Game report: 
UPDATE and Game report  
Registered: READ. 
 
Figure A2 18 TLS/SSL Protocol implementation, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2014) 
SRQ100: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public and private keys) 
certified by a certification authority 
SRQ101: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the Game, Game report, 
Confirmation and Game info (and notification messages) using the keys before sending it to 
ERIS. 
SRQ102: Umpire should encrypt and sign the Game report (and notification messages) using the 
keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQ103: Create Game interface should filter Game info, Confirmation and Game report. 
SRQ104: Create Game interface should sanitize the Game info, Confirmation and Game report 
to transform it to the required format. 
SRQ105: Create Game interface should canonicalize the Game info, Confirmation and Game 
report to verify it against its canonical representation. 
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SRQ106: Enter Game report interface should canonicalize the Game report to verify it against its 
canonical representation. 
SRQ107: Enter Game interface should sanitize the Game report to transform it to the required 
format. 
SRQ108: Enter Game interface should sanitize the Game report to transform it to the required 
format. 
 
 
Figure A2 19 Register game report Network infrastructure model 
 
SRQ109: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business partners such as 
Football Association employee. 
SRQ110: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Create 
Game, to determine the validity of the Game info and Game report received from the Football 
Association employee 
SRQ111: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Enter 
Game report, to determine the validity of the Game report received from the Umpire. 
SRQ112: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Create 
Game report, to determine the validity of the Game report received from the Football 
Association employee. 
SRQ113: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Confirm 
Game report, to determine the validity of the Confirmation received from the Football 
Association employee. 
SRQ114: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which represents the Amend 
Game report, to determine the validity of the Game report received from the Football 
Association employee. 
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Figure A2 20 Game report registration database RBAC model 
 
SRQ115: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Game, Game info, Game report 
and Confirmation.  
SRQ116: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Game when it is stored in the Game 
Database. 
SRQ117: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Game info when it is stored in the Game 
Database. 
SRQ118: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Game report when it is stored in the Game 
Database. 
SRQ119: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Confirmation when it is stored in the Game 
Database. 
SRQ120: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football Association 
employee’s requests for additional conditions of established communication. 
SRQ121: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Umpire’s requests for 
additional conditions of established communication. 
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SREBP security requirements categorization 
The security requirements elicited in Appendix section A 2 were categorized and compiled into 
the following lists according to business assets. 
 
Table A2 1: Player BA security requirements 
Player  
SRQBA1:1 SRQ18: Football Association employee: should be able to Create the 
Player. 
SRQBA1:2 SRQ19: Football Association employee: should be able to Read the 
Player info. 
SRQBA1:3 SRQ20: The Player should be able to Read the Player info. 
SRQBA1:4 SRQ21: The Team rep should be able to Read the Player info. 
SRQBA1:5 SRQ22: Permission Info registered: READ should be given only to one 
user assigned to The Player role. 
SRQBA1:6 SRQ23: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs 
(public and private keys) certified by a certification authority 
SRQBA1:7 SRQ24: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the 
Player info (and notification messages) using the keys before sending it 
to ERIS. 
SRQBA1:8 SRQ25: Create Player interface should filter Player info. 
SRQBA1:9 SRQ26: Create Player interface should sanitize the Player info to 
transform it to the required format 
SRQBA1:10 SRQ27: Create Player interface should canonicalize the Player info to 
verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQBA1:11 SRQ28: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business 
partners such as Football Association employee. 
SRQBA1:12 SRQ29: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Create Player, to determine the validity of the Player info 
received from the Football Association employee 
SRQBA1:13 SRQ30: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the 
Football Association employee’s requests for additional conditions of 
established communication. 
SRQBA1:14 SRQ31: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until 
these ports are explicitly opened. 
SRQBA1:15 SRQ32: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Player and 
Player info to the Player Database. 
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SRQBA1:16 SRQ33: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Player when it is 
stored in the Player Database. 
SRQBA1:17 SRQ34: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Player info when it is 
stored in the Player Database. 
SRQBA1:18 SRQ34: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Player performance 
when it is stored in the Player Database. 
Table A2 2: Team BA security requirements 
Team  
SRQBA2:1 SRQ1: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the 
Team 
SRQBA2:2 SRQ2: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the 
Team info and Team rep. 
SRQBA2:3 SRQ3: Team representative should be able to: Read the Team info and 
Team rep. 
SRQBA2:4 SRQ4: Permission Access to Team received: READ should be given 
only to one user assigned to Team Rep. This user also receives 
permission Update Team info: UPDATE. 
SRQBA2:5 SRQ5: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs 
(public and private keys) certified by a certification authority 
SRQBA2:6 SRQ6: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the 
Team info (and notification messages) using the keys before sending it 
to ERIS. 
SRQBA2:7 SRQ7: Create Team interface should filter Team info. 
SRQBA2:8 SRQ8: Create Team interface should sanitize the Team info to 
transform it to the required format 
SRQBA2:9 SRQ9: Create Team interface should canonicalize the Team info to 
verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQBA2:10 SRQ10: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with 
business partners such as Football Association employee. 
SRQBA2:11 SRQ11: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Create Team, to determine the validity of the Team info 
received from the Football association employee 
SRQBA2:12 SRQ12: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the 
Football association employee’s requests for additional conditions of 
established communication. 
SRQBA2:13 SRQ13: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until 
these ports are explicitly opened. 
SRQBA2:14 SRQ14: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Team, 
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Team info and Team rep to the Team Database. 
SRQBA2:15 SRQ15: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Team when it is 
stored in the Team Database. 
SRQBA2:16 SRQ16: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Team info when it is 
stored in the Team Database. 
SRQBA2:17 SRQ17: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Team rep when it is 
stored in the Team Database. 
SRQBA2:18 SRQ57: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the 
Regions and leagues. 
SRQBA2:19 SRQ58: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the 
Participation decision and Regions and leagues. 
SRQBA2:20 SRQ59: Team rep should be able to: Create the Participation decision. 
SRQBA2:21 SRQ60: Team rep should be able to: Read the Participation decision 
and Regions and leagues.  
SRQBA2:22 SRQ64: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the 
Timetable info, Schedule, Timetable confirmation, Regions and leagues 
and Umpire assignments (and notification messages) using the keys 
before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA2:23 SRQ65: Team rep should encrypt and sign the Participation decision 
(and notification messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA2:24 SRQ69: Send decision interface should filter Participation decision. 
SRQBA2:25 SRQ70: Send decision interface should sanitize the Participation 
decision to transform it to the required format. 
SRQBA2:26 SRQ71: Send decision interface should canonicalize the Participation 
decision to verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQBA2:27 SRQ80: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Assign regions and form leagues, to determine the 
validity of the Regions and leagues received from the Football 
Association employee. 
SRQBA2:28 SRQ83: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the 
Team rep’s requests for additional conditions of established 
communication. 
SRQBA2:29 SRQ81: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Send decision, to determine the validity of the 
Participation decision received from the Team rep. 
SRQBA2:30 SRQ89: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of 
Participation decision and Regions and leagues in the Team Database. 
SRQBA2:31 SRQ90: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Participation 
decision when it is stored in the Team Database. 
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SRQBA2:32 SRQ91: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Regions and leagues 
when it is stored in the Team Database. 
 
 
 
Table A2 3: Umpire BA security requirements 
Umpire  
SRQBA3:1 SRQ35: Football Association employee: should be able to:  Create the 
Umpire . 
SRQBA3:2 SRQ36: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the 
Umpire info and Umpire access. 
SRQBA3:3 SRQ37: Umpire should be able to: Read the Umpire info and Umpire info 
message. 
SRQBA3:4 SRQ38: Permission Umpire access received: READ should be given only 
to one user assigned to The Umpire role. 
SRQBA3:5 SRQ39: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public 
and private keys) certified by a certification authority 
SRQBA3:6 SRQ40: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the Umpire 
info (and notification messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA3:7 SRQ41: Create Umpire interface should filter Umpire info. 
SRQBA3:8 SRQ42: Create Umpire interface should sanitize the Umpire info to 
transform it to the required format. 
SRQBA3:9 SRQ43: Create Umpire interface should canonicalize the Umpire info to 
verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQBA3:1
0 
SRQ44: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business 
partners such as Football Association employee. 
SRQBA3:1
1 
SRQ45: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Create Umpire, to determine the validity of the Umpire info 
received from the Football Association employee 
SRQBA3:1
2 
SRQ46: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football 
Association employee’s requests for additional conditions of established 
communication. 
SRQBA3:1
3 
SRQ47: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until these 
ports are explicitly opened. 
SRQBA3:1
4 
SRQ48: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Umpire, 
Umpire info and Umpire access to the Umpire Database. 
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SRQBA3:1
5 
SRQ49: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Umpire when it is stored 
in the Umpire Database. 
SRQBA3:1
6 
SRQ50: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Umpire info when it is 
stored in the Umpire Database. 
SRQBA3:1
7 
SRQ51: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Umpire access when it is 
stored in the Umpire Database. 
SRQBA3:1
8 
SRQ61: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the 
Assigned games. 
SRQBA3:1
9 
SRQ62: The Umpire: should be able to: Read the Assigned games. 
SRQBA3:2
0 
SRQ64: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the 
Timetable info, Schedule, Timetable confirmation, Regions and leagues and 
Umpire assignments (and notification messages) using the keys before 
sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA3:2
1 
SRQ72: Enter Umpire assignments interface should filter Assigned games. 
SRQBA3:2
2 
SRQ73: Enter Umpire assignments interface should sanitize the Assigned 
games to transform it to the required format. 
SRQBA3:2
3 
SRQ74: Enter Umpire assignments interface should canonicalize the 
Assigned games to verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQBA3:2
4 
SRQ92: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Assigned 
games in the Umpire Database. 
SRQBA3:2
5 
SRQ93: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Assigned games when it 
is stored in the Umpire Database. 
 
Table A2 4: Game BA security requirements 
Game  
SRQBA4:
1 
SRQ94: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the Game, 
Game report, Game confirmation,  and Game info. 
SRQBA4:
2 
SRQ95: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the Game, 
Game entry, Game confirmation, Game report and Game info. 
SRQBA4:
3 
SRQ96: Umpire should be able to update the Game report. 
SRQBA4:
4 
SRQ97: Umpire should be able to read the Game report and Game info. 
SRQBA4:
5 
SRQ98: Permission Game report registered: READ should be given only to 
one user assigned to Football Association employee role. This user also 
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receives the permissions Verify Game report: READ, Amend info in Game 
report: UPDATE, Confirm Game Report: CREATE and Game report 
confirmed: READ. 
SRQBA4:
6 
SRQ99: Permission Select Game: READ should be given only to one user 
assigned to Umpire role. This user also receives the permissions Game 
viewed: READ, Enter Game report: UPDATE and Game report registered: 
READ. 
SRQBA4:
7 
SRQ100: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public 
and private keys) certified by a certification authority 
SRQBA4:
8 
SRQ101: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the Game, 
Game report, Confirmation and Game info (and notification messages) using 
the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA4:
9 
SRQ102: Umpire should encrypt and sign the Game report (and notification 
messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA4:
10 
SRQ103: Create Game interface should filter Game info, Confirmation and 
Game report. 
SRQBA4:
11 
SRQ104: Create Game interface should sanitize the Game info, 
Confirmation and Game report to transform it to the required format. 
SRQBA4:
12 
SRQ105: Create Game interface should canonicalize the Game info, 
Confirmation and Game report to verify it against its canonical 
representation. 
SRQBA4:
13 
SRQ106: Enter Game report interface should canonicalize the Game report 
to verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQBA4:
14 
SRQ107: Enter Game interface should sanitize the Game report to transform 
it to the required format. 
SRQBA4:
15 
SRQ108: Enter Game interface should sanitize the Game report to transform 
it to the required format. 
SRQBA4:
16 
SRQ109: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business 
partners such as Football Association employee. 
SRQBA4:
17 
SRQ110: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Create Game, to determine the validity of the Game info and 
Game report received from the Football Association employee 
SRQBA4:
18 
SRQ111: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Enter Game report, to determine the validity of the Game 
report received from the Umpire. 
SRQBA4:
19 
SRQ112: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Create Game report, to determine the validity of the Game 
report received from the Football Association employee. 
SRQBA4: SRQ113: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
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20 represents the Confirm Game report, to determine the validity of the 
Confirmation received from the Football Association employee. 
SRQBA4:
21 
SRQ114: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Amend Game report, to determine the validity of the Game 
report received from the Football Association employee. 
SRQBA4:
22 
SRQ115: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Game, Game 
info, Game report and Confirmation.  
SRQBA4:
23 
SRQ116: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Game when it is stored 
in the Game Database. 
SRQBA4:
24 
SRQ117: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Game info when it is 
stored in the Game Database. 
SRQBA4:
25 
SRQ118: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Game report when it is 
stored in the Game Database. 
SRQBA4:
26 
SRQ119: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Confirmation when it is 
stored in the Game Database. 
SRQBA4:
27 
SRQ120: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football 
Association employee’s requests for additional conditions of established 
communication. 
SRQBA4:
28 
SRQ121: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the 
Umpire’s requests for additional conditions of established communication. 
SRQBA4:
29 
SRQ47: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until these 
ports are explicitly opened. 
 
Table A2 5: Timetable BA security requirements 
Timetable  
SRQBA5:
1 
SRQ52: Football Association employee: should be able to: Create the 
Timetable, Schedule and Timetable confirmation. 
SRQBA5:
2 
SRQ53: Football Association employee: should be able to: Read the 
Timetable info, Schedule and Timetable confirmation. 
SRQBA5:
3 
SRQ54: Football Association employee should be able to: Update the 
Schedule. 
SRQBA5:
4 
SRQ55: Team representative should be able to: Read the Schedule 
SRQBA5:
5 
SRQ56: Permission Prepare Timetable: CREATE should be given only to 
one user assigned to Football Association employee role. This user also 
receives the permissions Timetable info registered: READ, Create Schedule: 
CREATE, Schedule created: READ, Verify Schedule: READ, Edit 
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Schedule: UPDATE and Confirm Timetable: CREATE. 
SRQBA5:
6 
SRQ63: ERIS should have a unique identity in the form of key pairs (public 
and private keys) certified by a certification authority 
SRQBA5:
7 
SRQ64: Football Association employee should encrypt and sign the 
Timetable info, Schedule, Timetable confirmation, Regions and leagues and 
Umpire assignments (and notification messages) using the keys before 
sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA5:
8 
SRQ65: Team rep should encrypt and sign the Participation decision (and 
notification messages) using the keys before sending it to ERIS. 
SRQBA5:
9 
SRQ66: Create Timetable interface should filter Timetable info and 
Schedule. 
SRQBA5:
10 
SRQ67: Create Timetable interface should sanitize the Timetable info and 
Schedule to transform it to the required format. 
SRQBA5:
11 
SRQ68: Create Timetable interface should canonicalize the Timetable info 
and Schedule to verify it against its canonical representation. 
SRQBA5:
12 
SRQ75: ERIS should establish a rule base to communicate with business 
partners such as Football Association employee. 
SRQBA5:
13 
SRQ76: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Create Timetable, to determine the validity of the Timetable 
info and Timetable confirmation received from the Football Association 
employee 
SRQBA5:
14 
SRQ77: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Create Schedule, to determine the validity of the Schedule 
received from the Football Association employee. 
SRQBA5:
15 
SRQ78: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Edit Schedule, to determine the validity of the Schedule 
received from the Football Association employee. 
SRQBA5:
16 
SRQ79: Proxy based firewall should communicate to the proxy, which 
represents the Confirm Timetable, to determine the validity of the Timetable 
confirmation received from the Football Association employee. 
SRQBA5:
17 
SRQ82: Stateful firewall should maintain a state table to check the Football 
Association employee’s requests for additional conditions of established 
communication. 
SRQBA5:
18 
SRQ85: ERIS should audit the operations after the storage of Timetable, 
Timetable info, Schedule and Timetable confirmation in the Timetable 
Database. 
SRQBA5:
19 
SRQ86: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Timetable info when it is 
stored in the Timetable Database. 
SRQBA5: SRQ87: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Schedule when it is 
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20 stored in the Timetable Database. 
SRQBA5:
21 
SRQ88: ERIS should perform an operation to hide Timetable confirmation 
when it is stored in the Timetable Database. 
SRQBA5:
22 
SRQ47: ERIS should block all default incoming ports by default until these 
ports are explicitly opened. 
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Section A3: SQUARE implementation 
This section covers the security requirements elicitation section for SQUARE 
 
 
Figure A2 1: Misuse cases diagram for BA1 and BA2 – SQL and privilege escalation 
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Table A3 1 : SQL injection 
Business asset  Player, Team, Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R3 
IS Asset Team and player Database 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker carries out an SQL injection attack and gains access to the 
database thus negating the confidentiality of the business assets 
Impact Loss of confidentiality of the business assets 
Event Hacker carries out an SQL injection attack and is able to gain 
access to the database 
Vulnerability No input sanitization or canonicalization of inputs 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker can carry out an SQL injection to gain access to the 
database 
Attack method SQL injection 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement An access control list (ACL) should be implemented 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ3 
Control Implement an ACL. 
Cost of control 0-500 EUR 
 
Table A3 2: Escalation of privileges 
Business asset  Player, Team,Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R4 
IS Asset Team and player Database 
Security criterion CIA of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker escalates their privileges on the database, thereby gaining 
full root access to the database, allowing them to access, view, 
modify and delete all the data and negate the CIA of the business 
assets. 
Impact Loss of CIA of the business assets 
Event Hacker escalates their privileges and gains full root access to the 
database due to no access control lists being in place 
Vulnerability No set access control lists. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to escalate their privileges to gain full root access to 
the database 
Attack method Escalation of privileges 
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Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation should be 
implemented. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ4 
Control Implement input sanitization and canonicalization 
Cost of control 0-1000 EUR 
 
 
Figure A2 2: Misuse cases diagram for BA1 and BA2 – Social engineering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Table A3 3: Social engineering 
Business asset  Player, Team, Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R5 
IS Asset Team and player Database 
Security criterion C and I of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker uses social engineering/phishing to gain access to the 
Football Association employee’s computer as the employee has not 
been trained to detect social engineering attempts. The hacker is 
able to gain full access to the database through the Football 
Association employee’s computer 
Impact Loss of C and I of the business assets 
Event Hacker uses social engineering (phishing for example) to gain 
access to their computer and thereby access the database 
Vulnerability No anti-social engineering training 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to use social engineering on one of the Football 
Association employees 
Attack method Social engineering 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement  social engineering training for employees should be implemented 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ5 
Control Implement social engineering awareness training for employees 
Cost of control 50 EUR per employee 
 
Figure A2 3: Misuse cases diagram for BA1 and BA2 – DDoS attack 
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Table A3 4: DDoS attack 
Business asset  Player, Team, Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R6 
IS Asset Team and player Database 
Security criterion Availability of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker launches a DDoS attack against the databases as no 
countermeasures have been set up to mitigate this. This leads to the 
service being unavailable for the users.  
Impact Loss of availability of the data 
Event Hacker attacks the databases using DDoS as no ip address filtering 
is set in place 
Vulnerability No countermeasures set up, no ip address filtering. 
Threat agent Hacker with a botnet 
Threat A hacker launching a DDoS attack against the databases 
Attack method Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ6 
Control Implement an ACL 
Cost of Control 0 to 500 EUR 
 
 
 
Figure A2 4: Misuse cases diagram for BA1 and BA2 – Unauthorized data 
manipulation 
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Table A3 5: Unauthorized data manipulation 
Business asset  Player, Team, Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R7 
IS Asset Team and player database 
Security criterion CIA of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker hacks into the database and is able to access and view the 
unencrypted data which leads to the loss of CIA of the data.  
Impact Loss of CIA of the data 
Event Hacker hacks into the database and is able to read the data as it is 
saved in plaintext 
Vulnerability No encryption of data 
Threat agent Hacker  
Threat A hacker is able to hack into the database and freely read data 
Attack method Hacking into the database 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Data stored in the database should be encrypted 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ7 
Control Implement data encryption 
Cost of Control 0 EUR 
 
 
 
Figure A2 5: Misuse cases diagram for BA1 and BA2 – Unauthorized data 
manipulation 
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Table A3 6: Hacker changes team information before league entry is created. 
Business asset Player, Team, Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R8 
IS Asset Team and player database 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the makeup of the league, which teams will play 
etc. 
Integrity of the composition of the league. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker is able to hack the Team and player database and modify the 
data before league entries are created, resulting in incorrect league 
entries to be created which result in the loss of integrity of the data 
Impact Loss of integrity of the business asset. 
Event Hacker is able to access the database and change the data entry 
causing incorrect league entry to be created 
Vulnerability No auditing of the team information before league entry creation. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to hack the Team and player database and modify 
data 
Attack method Hacking the Team and player database and modifying data 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement The entries in the database should be audited regularly. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ8 
Control Implement regular database auditing 
Cost of control 1000 – 5000 EUR 
 
 
Figure A2 6: Use cases diagram for BA3 
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Figure A2 7: Misuse cases diagram for BA3 – Hacking and unauthorized data deletion 
Table A3 7: Unauthorized data manipulation 
Business asset Umpire 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R9 
IS Asset Umpires and coaches database 
Security criterion CIA of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker hacks into the database and is able to access and view the 
unencrypted data which leads to the loss of CIA of the data.  
Impact Loss of CIA of the data 
Event Hacker hacks into the database and is able to read the data as it is 
saved in plaintext 
Vulnerability No encryption of data 
Threat agent Hacker  
Threat A hacker is able to hack into the database and freely read data 
Attack method Hacking into the database 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Data stored in the database should be encrypted 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ9 
Control Implement data encryption 
Cost of Control 0 EUR 
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Figure A2 8: cases diagram for BA3– Hacking and unauthorized access 
Table A3 8: Hacker accessing and modifying the Team and player database 
Business asset Umpire 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R10 
IS Asset Umpire and coaches database 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the Umpire’s personal information. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker hacks into the database thus negating the confidentiality of 
the data. 
Impact Loss of confidentiality of the business asset. 
Event Hacker hacks into the database due to user permissions not being 
checked when data is accessed 
Vulnerability User permissions are not checked when data is accessed. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to hack into the database 
Attack method Hacking the Team and player database 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Only authorized personnel should be able to access the database. 
User credentials must be checked 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ10 
Control Implementation of Estonian national ID card authentication 
software 
Cost of control 500 EUR 
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Table A3 9: Hacker hacks into the Umpire and coaches database to manipulate umpire’s 
information. 
Business asset Umpire 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R11 
IS Asset Umpire and coaches database 
Security criterion Availability and integrity of the Umpire’s information. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker hacks into the database and changes data thus negating the 
availability and integrity of the data. 
Impact Loss of availability and integrity of the business asset. 
Event Hacker hacks into the database and changes the data. 
Vulnerability User permissions are not checked when data is being modified. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker can hack into the database and change data. 
Attack method Hacking the Team and player database 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Authentication should be implemented when data is being 
modified. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ11 
Control Implement authentication software 
Cost of control 0-1000 EUR 
 
 
Figure A2 9: Misuse cases diagram for BA3 – SQL and privilege escalation 
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Table A3 10: SQL injection 
Business asset  Umpire 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R12 
IS Asset Umpire and coaches database 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker carries out an SQL injection attack and gains access to the 
database thus negating the confidentiality of the business assets 
Impact Loss of confidentiality of the business assets 
Event Hacker carries out an SQL injection attack and is able to gain 
access to the database 
Vulnerability No input sanitization or canonicalization of inputs 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker can carry out an SQL injection to gain access to the 
database 
Attack method SQL injection 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation has to be 
implemented. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ12 
 
Table A3 11: Escalation of privileges 
Business asset  Umpire 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R13 
IS Asset Umpire and coaches database 
Security criterion CIA of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker escalates their privileges on the database, thereby gaining 
full root access to the database, allowing them to access, view, 
modify and delete all the data and negate the CIA of the business 
assets. 
Impact Loss of CIA of the business assets 
Event Hacker escalates their privileges and gains full root access to the 
database due to no access control lists being in place 
Vulnerability No set access control lists. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to escalate their privileges to gain full root access to 
the database 
Attack method Escalation of privileges 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
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Security requirement An access control list (ACL) should be implemented 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ13 
Control Implement an ACL. 
Cost of control 0-500 EUR 
Security requirement An access control list (ACL) should be implemented 
 
 
Figure A2 10: Misuse cases diagram for BA3 – Social engineering 
Table A3 12: Social engineering 
Business asset  Umpire 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R14 
IS Asset Umpires and coaches database 
Security criterion C and I of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker uses social engineering/phishing to gain access to the 
Football Association employee’s computer as the employee has not 
been trained to detect social engineering attempts. The hacker is 
able to gain full access to the database through the Football 
Association employee’s computer 
Impact Loss of C and I of the business assets 
Event Hacker uses social engineering (phishing for example) to gain 
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access to their computer and thereby access the database 
Vulnerability No anti-social engineering training 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to use social engineering on one of the Football 
Association employees 
Attack method Social engineering 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Implement social engineering training for employees 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ14 
Control Implement social engineering awareness training for employees 
Cost of control 50 EUR per employee 
 
 
Figure A2 11: Misuse cases diagram for BA3 – DDoS attack 
 
Table A3 13: DDoS attack 
Business asset Umpire 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID 15 
IS Asset Umpires and coaches database 
Security criterion Availability of the business assets 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker launches a DDoS attack against the databases as no 
countermeasures have been set up to mitigate this. This leads to the 
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service being unavailable for the users.  
Impact Loss of availability of the data 
Event Hacker attacks the databases using DDoS as no ip address filtering 
is set in place 
Vulnerability No countermeasures set up, no ip address filtering. 
Threat agent Hacker with a botnet 
Threat A hacker launching a DDoS attack against the databases 
Attack method Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ15 
Control Implement an ACL 
Cost of Control 0 to 500 EUR 
 
Figure A2 12: Misuse cases diagram for BA3: Unauthorized data manipulation 
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Table A3 14: Unauthorized data manipulation 
Business asset Game, Timetable 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R16 
IS Asset Team and player database 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the makeup of the league, which teams will play 
etc. 
Integrity of the composition of the league. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker is able to hack the Team and player database and modify the 
data before league entries are created, resulting in incorrect league 
entries to be created which result in the loss of integrity of the data 
Impact Loss of integrity of the business asset. 
Event Hacker is able to access the database and change the data entry 
causing incorrect league entry to be created 
Vulnerability No auditing of the team information before league entry creation. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to hack the Team and player database and modify 
data 
Attack method Hacking the Team and player database and modifying data 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement The entries in the database should be audited regularly. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ8 
Control Implement regular database auditing 
Cost of control 1000 – 5000 EUR 
 
 
Figure A2 13: Use cases diagram for BA4 and BA5 
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Figure A2 
14: Misuse cases diagram for BA4 and BA5 – Unauthorized data manipulation 
Table A3 15: Malicious user modifies the timetabling software output. 
Business asset Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R17 
IS Asset Timetabling software 
Security criterion Integrity of the timetable, the timetable has to meet the regulations 
set by UEFA/FIFA. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Malicious user/disgruntled employee is able to change the team 
matchups manually due to no authentication/validation of the 
timetable in place resulting in the loss of integrity for the business 
asset.   
Impact The timetable has non-random matchups between teams, the 
integrity of the business asset is compromised 
Event Malicious user/disgruntled employee changes the team matchups 
manually without having to validate or authenticate the changes 
Vulnerability No system to validate and authenticate the timetable 
Threat agent Malicious user/disgruntled employee 
Threat Malicious user/disgruntled employee changes the team matchups 
manually 
Attack method The team matchups are changed manually 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement The output of the software should be compared to the timetable 
input. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ17 
Control Implement output comparison software 
Cost of control 0 to 500 EUR 
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Figure A2 15: Use cases diagram for BA6 and BA7 
 
Figure A2 16:  Misuse cases diagram for BA1, BA2 and BA3- Unauthorized file 
manipulation 
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Table A3 16: unauthorized data manipulation 
Business asset Database related BA 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R18 
IS Asset Team and player database, Coaches and umpires database, 
Games database 
Security criterion CIA of the business asset 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Hacker hacks the database and changes entries, leading to the loss 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data. 
Impact Loss of CIA of the business asset. 
Event Hacker is able to hack the database and edit entries due to no 
controls being in place to check who can edit data 
Vulnerability No controls in place to determine who can edit data. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker is able to hack the database and edit entries 
Attack method Hacking the database and editing entries 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Data in the database should only be modifiable through ERIS after 
proper authentication. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ18 
Control Only make the databases accessible through ERIS 
Cost of control 0 to 500 EUR 
 
Table A3 17: Attacker intentionally deletes umpire ID from the database. 
Business asset Database related BA 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R19 
IS Asset Team and player database, Coaches and umpires database, 
Games database 
Security criterion Integrity and availability of the database entries 
Risk related concepts 
Risk The attacker can delete entries in the databases and due to no 
backups, the entry cannot be recovered leading to the loss of 
integrity and availability of the business asset. 
Impact Loss of integrity and availability of the business asset. 
Event The attacker deletes the entry in the database which then cannot be 
recovered due to no backups of the database 
Vulnerability No backups for the entries in the user database 
Threat agent Malicious user 
Threat  data being deleted from the database due to malicious activity. 
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Attack method Accessing and deleting data entries from the database 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Regular backups of the databases should be introduced. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ19 
Control Implement monthly backups 
Cost of control 0 to 500 EUR 
 
 
Figure A2 17: Use cases diagram for BA2 
 
Figure A2 18: Misuse cases diagram forBA2– Man in the middle attack 
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Table A3 18: Session hijacking 
Business asset Team 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R20 
IS Asset ERIS 
Security criterion IA of the Business asset 
Risk related concepts 
Risk The attacker uses man in the middle attack to listen in on the data 
exchange leading to the loss of integrity and availability of the data 
Impact Loss of integrity and availability of the business asset. Loss of 
reliability of the medium of transportation. 
Event A hacker carries out a man in the middle attack due to no firewall 
being present 
Vulnerability No firewall in place to filter incoming and outgoing requests and 
data. 
Threat agent Hacker 
Threat Hacker carries out a man in the middle attack 
Attack method Listening in on the data traffic/man in the middle attack 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Any and all data exchange between the user and the server should 
be encrypted 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ20 
Control Implement data encryption whenever data is being transferred 
Cost of control 0 to 500 EUR 
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Figure A2 19: Use cases diagram for BA9 
Figure A2 20: Misuse cases diagram for BA9 – session hijacking 
 
Table A3 19: Unauthorized data modification 
Business asset Game 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R21 
IS Asset Game database,  
Security criterion CIA of the Game. 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Attacker is able to hijack the session used by an authorized user to 
access and/or modify confidential data without the risk of being 
caught due to no monitoring software being utilized thus 
compromising the CIA of the business asset. 
Impact Loss of integrity, confidentiality and availability of the business 
asset.  
Event The attacker hijacks an authorized user’s session and is able to 
access the data for theft or modification without risk of being 
caught due to monitoring software. 
Vulnerability No monitoring software in place 
Threat agent Hacker 
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Threat Hacker hijacks the session and steals and/or modifies data 
Attack method Session hijacking of authorized users or another way of gaining 
access to the databases to steal or modify data. 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Implement monitoring software to notify the administrator of any 
suspicious access/file modifications. 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ21 
Control Install monitoring software for the database 
Cost of control 0 to 500 EUR 
 
Figure A2 21: Misuse cases diagram for all BAs – virus infection  
 
Table A3 20: Virus infection 
Business asset All 
Asset related concepts 
Risk ID R22 
IS Asset ERIS 
Security criterion CIA of the data 
Risk related concepts 
Risk Due to no antivirus software being installed, employees may 
inadvertently install viruses on their computers by clicking on 
infected links. The viruses can then infect the workstation and gain 
root access to the systems. 
Impact Loss of integrity, confidentiality and availability of the business 
asset.  
Event An employee clicks on a compromised link, downloading a virus to 
the workstation due to no antivirus software being present, this 
allows the virus to gain root access to the systems. 
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Vulnerability No antivirus software is installed 
Threat agent Owner of the virus 
Threat Due to no antivirus software, the virus is able to infect workstations 
on ERIS and gain root access to the systems. 
Attack method Virus is able to infect workstations on ERIS and gain access to the 
systems. 
Risk Treatment related concepts 
Security requirement Antivirus software should be installed on all workstations 
Security requirement 
ID 
SRQ22 
Control Install antivirus software for workstations 
Cost of control 0 EUR to 5000 EUR/year 
 
SQUARE Requirements Categorization 
The security requirements elicited using SQUARE are categorized below according to their 
BAs. 
Table A3 21: BA1 – Player  
SRQ ID Player Business Asset SRQ Description 
SRQ1.1 Only authorized personnel should be able to access the Player Business Asset. User 
credentials must be checked 
SRQ2.1 Authentication should be implemented when data is being modified in the Player 
Business Asset 
SRQ3.1 An access control list (ACL) should be implemented to access the Player Business 
Asset 
SRQ4.1 Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation should be implemented for any 
inputs interfacing with the Player Business Asset 
SRQ5 Social engineering training for employees should be implemented 
SRQ6.1 ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented when accessing the Player 
Business Asset 
SRQ7.1 Data stored in the Player Business Asset should be encrypted 
SRQ8.1 Data stored in the Player Business Asset should be audited regularly 
SRQ10.1 Data in the Player Business Asset should only be modifiable through ERIS after 
proper authentication. 
SRQ11.1 Regular backups of the Player Business Asset should be introduced. 
SRQ12 Any and all data exchange between the user and the server should be encrypted 
SRQ13.1 Implement monitoring software to notify the administrator of any suspicious 
access/file modifications in the Player Business Asset 
SRQ14 Antivirus software should be installed on all workstations 
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Table A3 22: BA2 – Team  
SRQ ID Team Business Asset SRQ Description 
SRQ1.2 Only authorized personnel should be able to access the Team Business Asset. 
User credentials must be checked 
SRQ2.2 Authentication should be implemented when data is being modified in the 
Team Business Asset 
SRQ3.2 An access control list (ACL) should be implemented to access the Team 
Business Asset 
SRQ4.2 Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation should be implemented for 
any inputs interfacing with the Team Business Asset 
SRQ5 Social engineering training for employees should be implemented 
SRQ6.2 ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented when accessing the 
Team Business Asset 
SRQ7.2 Data stored in the Team Business Asset should be encrypted 
SRQ8.2 Data stored in the Team Business Asset should be audited regularly 
SRQ10.2 Data in the Team Business Asset should only be modifiable through ERIS 
after proper authentication. 
SRQ11.2 Regular backups of the Team Business Asset should be introduced. 
SRQ12 Any and all data exchange between the user and the server should be 
encrypted 
SRQ13.2 Implement monitoring software to notify the administrator of any suspicious 
access/file modifications in the Team Business Asset 
SRQ14 Antivirus software should be installed on all workstations 
 
Table A3 23: BA3- Umpire 
SRQ ID Umpire Business Asset SRQ Description 
SRQ1.3 Only authorized personnel should be able to access the Umpire Business Asset. 
User credentials must be checked 
SRQ2.3 Authentication should be implemented when data is being modified in the 
Umpire Business Asset 
SRQ3.3 An access control list (ACL) should be implemented to access the Umpire 
Business Asset 
SRQ4.3 Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation should be implemented for 
any inputs interfacing with the Umpire Business Asset 
SRQ5 Social engineering training for employees should be implemented 
SRQ6.3 ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented when accessing the 
Umpire Business Asset 
SRQ7.3 Data stored in the Umpire Business Asset should be encrypted 
SRQ8.3 Data stored in the Umpire Business Asset should be audited regularly 
SRQ10.
3 
Data in the Umpire Business Asset should only be modifiable through ERIS 
after proper authentication. 
SRQ11.
3 
Regular backups of the Umpire Business Asset should be introduced. 
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SRQ12 Any and all data exchange between the user and the server should be encrypted 
SRQ13.
3 
Implement monitoring software to notify the administrator of any suspicious 
access/file modifications in the Umpire Business Asset 
SRQ14 Antivirus software should be installed on all workstations 
 
Table A3 24: BA4- Game 
SRQ ID Game Business Asset SRQ Description 
SRQ1.4 Only authorized personnel should be able to access the Game Business Asset. 
User credentials must be checked 
SRQ2.4 Authentication should be implemented when data is being modified in the 
Game Business Asset 
SRQ3.4 An access control list (ACL) should be implemented to access the Game 
Business Asset 
SRQ4.4 Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation should be implemented for 
any inputs interfacing with the Game Business Asset 
SRQ5 Social engineering training for employees should be implemented 
SRQ6.4 ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented when accessing the 
Game Business Asset 
SRQ7.4 Data stored in the Game Business Asset should be encrypted 
SRQ8.4 Data stored in the Game Business Asset should be audited regularly 
SRQ10.4 Data in the Game Business Asset should only be modifiable through ERIS 
after proper authentication. 
SRQ11.4 Regular backups of the Game Business Asset should be introduced. 
SRQ12 Any and all data exchange between the user and the server should be 
encrypted 
SRQ13.4 Implement monitoring software to notify the administrator of any suspicious 
access/file modifications in the Game Business Asset 
SRQ14 Antivirus software should be installed on all workstations 
Table A3 25:  BA5- Timetable 
SRQ ID Timetable Business Asset SRQ Description 
SRQ1.5 Only authorized personnel should be able to access the Timetable Business 
Asset. User credentials must be checked 
SRQ2.5 Authentication should be implemented when data is being modified in the 
Timetable Business Asset 
SRQ3.5 An access control list (ACL) should be implemented to access the Timetable 
Business Asset 
SRQ4.5 Input sanitization, canonicalization and validation should be implemented for 
any inputs interfacing with the Timetable Business Asset 
SRQ5 Social engineering training for employees should be implemented 
SRQ6.5 ACL and dynamic ip filtering should be implemented when accessing the 
Timetable Business Asset 
SRQ7.5 Data stored in the Timetable Business Asset should be encrypted 
SRQ8.5 Data stored in the Timetable Business Asset should be audited regularly 
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SRQ9 The software output should be compared to the input when compiling the 
timetable 
SRQ10.5 Data in the Timetable Business Asset should only be modifiable through ERIS 
after proper authentication. 
SRQ11.5 Regular backups of the Timetable Business Asset should be introduced. 
SRQ12 Any and all data exchange between the user and the server should be 
encrypted 
SRQ13.5 Implement monitoring software to notify the administrator of any suspicious 
access/file modifications in the Timetable Business Asset 
SRQ14 Antivirus software should be installed on all workstations 
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Section A4: Results Comparison Tables 
 
The tables below represent the comparison of completeness tables of the elicited security 
requirements. 
Table A4 1: Player BA 
 
 
 
Asset: Player
Requirements 
Categorization 
1.      Identification
C 6.25 SRQBA1:5
75% 4.69
C 6.25 SRQ1.1
50%            3.13    
I 6.25 SRQBA1:5 75% 4.69 I 6.25 0%                 -      
A - A -
2.      Authentication
C 4.17 SRQBA1:5, SRQBA1:6, SRQBA1:11, 
SRQBA1:12, SRQBA1:13 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.1, SRQ 
3.1 75%            3.13    
I 4.17 SRQBA1:5, SRQBA1:6, SRQBA1:11, 
SRQBA1:12, SRQBA1:13 100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.1
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA1:5, SRQBA1:11, 100% 4.17 A 4.17 SRQ2.1 50% 2.09
3.      Authorization 
C 4.17 SRQBA1:1, SRQBA1:2, SRQBA1:3, 
SRQBA1:4, SRQBA1:5, 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.1, 
SRQ3.1 100%            4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA1:1, SRQBA1:2, SRQBA1:3, 
SRQBA1:4, SRQBA1:5
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.1
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA1:11
SRQBA1:14
50% 2.085
A 4.17 SRQ6.1,  
SRQ2.1
25% 1.04
4.      Accounting 
C 4.17 SRQBA1:11, SRQBA1:12, SRQBA1:13, 
SRQBA1:14, SRQBA1:15 75% 3.1275
C 4.17 SRQ8.1, 
SRQ13.1 100%            4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA1:11, SRQBA1:12, SRQBA1:13, 
SRQBA1:14, SRQBA1:15
75% 3.1275
I 4.17 SRQ8.1, 
SRQ13.1
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQBA1:11, SRQBA1:12, SRQBA1:13, 
SRQBA1:14, SRQBA1:15 75% 3.1275
A 4.17 SRQ13.1
75% 3.13
5.      Audit C 4.17 SRQBA1:15 75% 3.1275 C 4.17 0%                 -      
I 4.17 SRQBA1:15 75% 3.1275 I 4.17 SRQ13.1 25% 1.04
A 4.17 SRQBA1:15 75% 3.1275 A 4.17 0% 0.00
6.      Non repudiation 
C - C
-
I 12.5 SRQBA1:15 75% 9.375 I 12.5 0.00
A - A -
7.      Immunity
C 4.17 SRQBA1:7, SRQBA1:8, SRQBA1:9, 
SRQBA1:10, SRQBA1:11, SRQBA1:12, 
SRQBA1:13, SRQBA1:14, SRQBA1:16, 
SRQBA1:17, SRQBA1:18
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ4.1, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
I 4.17 SRQBA1:7, SRQBA1:8, SRQBA1:9, 
SRQBA1:10, SRQBA1:11, SRQBA1:12, 
SRQBA1:13, SRQBA1:14, SRQBA1:16, 
SRQBA1:17, SRQBA1:18
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ4.1, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
A 4.17 SRQBA1:7, SRQBA1:8, SRQBA1:9, 
SRQBA1:10, SRQBA1:11, SRQBA1:12, 
SRQBA1:13, SRQBA1:14, SRQBA1:16, 
SRQBA1:17, SRQBA1:18
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ4.1, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
8.      Data Exchange
C 4.17 SRQBA1:6, SRQBA1:7, SRQBA1:11, 
SRQBA1:12, SRQBA1:13, SRQBA1:14 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
I 4.17 SRQBA1:6, SRQBA1:7, SRQBA1:11, 
SRQBA1:12, SRQBA1:13, SRQBA1:14 100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
A 4.17
0% 0
A 4.17 SRQ6.1, 
SRQ12
50% 2.09
81.30 45.87
Requirements (SREBP) Requirements (SQUARE)Coverage Coverage
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Table A4 2: Umpire BA 
 
Asset: Umpire
Requirements 
Categorization 
1.      Identification
C 6.25 SRQBA3:4
75% 4.69
C 6.25 SRQ1.3
50%  3.13    
I 6.25 SRQBA3:4 75% 4.69 I 6.25 0%       -      
A - A -
2.      Authentication
C 4.17 SRQBA3:4, SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:10, 
SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.3, SRQ 
3.3 75%  3.13    
I 4.17 SRQBA3:4, SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:10, 
SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.3
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:10
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ2.3
50% 2.09
3.      Authorization 
C 4.17 SRQBA3:1, SRQBA3:2, SRQBA3:3, 
SRQBA3:4, SRQBA3:18, SRQBA3:19 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.3, 
SRQ3.3 100%  4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA3:1, SRQBA3:2, SRQBA3:3, 
SRQBA3:4, SRQBA3:18, SRQBA3:19 100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.3
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA3:10, SRQBA3:13
50% 2.085
A 4.17 SRQ6.3,  
SRQ2.3
25% 1.04
4.      Accounting 
C 4.17 SRQBA3:10, SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, 
SRQBA3:13, SRQBA3:14 100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ8.3, 
SRQ13.3 100%  4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA3:10, SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, 
SRQBA3:13, SRQBA3:14 100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ8.3, 
SRQ13.3 100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQBA3:10, SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, 
SRQBA3:13, SRQBA3:14 100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ13.3
75% 3.13
5.      Audit C 4.17 SRQBA3:14, SRQBA3:24 75% 3.1275 C 4.17 0%       -      
I 4.17 SRQBA3:14, SRQBA3:24 75% 3.1275 I 4.17 SRQ13.3 25% 1.04
A 4.17 SRQBA3:14, SRQBA3:24 75% 3.1275 A 4.17 0% 0.00
6.      Non repudiation 
C - C
-
I 12.5 SRQBA3:14, SRQBA3:24 75% 9.375 I 12.5 0% 0.00
A - A -
7.      Immunity
C 4.17 SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:6, SRQBA3:7, 
SRQBA3:8, SRQBA3:9, SRQBA3:10, 
SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, SRQBA3:13, 
SRQBA3:15, SRQBA3:16, SRQBA3:17, 
SRQBA3:20, SRQBA3:21, SRQBA3:22, 
SRQBA3:23, SRQBA3:25
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ4.3, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
I 4.17 SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:6, SRQBA3:7, 
SRQBA3:8, SRQBA3:9, SRQBA3:10, 
SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, SRQBA3:13, 
SRQBA3:15, SRQBA3:16, SRQBA3:17, 
SRQBA3:20, SRQBA3:21, SRQBA3:22, 
SRQBA3:23, SRQBA3:25
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ4.3, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
A 4.17 SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:6, SRQBA3:7, 
SRQBA3:8, SRQBA3:9, SRQBA3:10, 
SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, SRQBA3:13, 
SRQBA3:15, SRQBA3:16, SRQBA3:17, 
SRQBA3:20, SRQBA3:21, SRQBA3:22, 
SRQBA3:23, SRQBA3:25
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ4.3, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
8.      Data Exchange
C 4.17 SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:6, SRQBA3:10, 
SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, SRQBA3:13, 
SRQBA3:20
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
I 4.17 SRQBA3:5, SRQBA3:6, SRQBA3:10, 
SRQBA3:11, SRQBA3:12, SRQBA3:13, 
SRQBA3:20
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
A 4.17
0% 0
A 4.17 SRQ6.3, 
SRQ12
50% 2.09
84.43 45.87
Requirements (SREBP) Requirements (SQUARE)Coverage Coverage
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Table A4 3: Game BA
 
Asset: Game
Requirements 
Categorization 
1.      Identification
C 6.25 SRQBA4:5, SRQBA4:6
75% 4.69
C 6.25 SRQ1.4
50%      3.13    
I 6.25 SRQBA4:5, SRQBA4:6 75% 4.69 I 6.25 0%          -      
A - A -
2.      
Authentication
C 4.17 SRQBA4:5, SRQBA4:6, SRQBA4:7, 
SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.4, SRQ 
3.4
75%      3.13    
I 4.17 SRQBA4:5, SRQBA4:6, SRQBA4:7, 
SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.4
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA4:7, SRQBA4:16
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ2.4
50% 2.09
3.      
Authorization 
C 4.17 SRQBA4:1, SRQBA4:2, SRQBA4:3, 
SRQBA4:4, SRQBA4:5, SRQBA4:6
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.4, 
SRQ3.4
100%      4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA4:1, SRQBA4:2, SRQBA4:3, 
SRQBA4:4, SRQBA4:5, SRQBA4:6
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.4
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:29
50% 2.085
A 4.17 SRQ6.4,  
SRQ2.4
25% 1.04
4.      Accounting 
C 4.17 SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:22, SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, 
SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ8.4, 
SRQ13.4
100%      4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:22, SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, 
SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ8.4, 
SRQ13.4
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:22, SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, 
SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ13.4
75% 3.13
5.      Audit C 4.17 SRQBA4:22 75% 3.1275 C 4.17 0%          -      
I 4.17 SRQBA4:22 75% 3.1275 I 4.17 0% 0.00
A 4.17 SRQBA4:22 75% 3.1275 A 4.17 0% 0.00
6.      Non 
repudiation 
C - C
-
I 12.5 SRQBA4:22 75% 9.375 I 12.5 SRQ13.4 25% 3.13
A - A -
7.      Immunity
C 4.17 SRQBA4:7, SRQBA4:8, SRQBA4:9, 
SRQBA4:10, SRQBA4:11, SRQBA4:12, 
SRQBA4:13, SRQBA4:14, SRQBA4:15, 
SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:23, SRQBA4:24, SRQBA4:25, 
SRQBA4:26, SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, 
SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ4.4, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
I 4.17 SRQBA4:7, SRQBA4:8, SRQBA4:9, 
SRQBA4:10, SRQBA4:11, SRQBA4:12, 
SRQBA4:13, SRQBA4:14, SRQBA4:15, 
SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:23, SRQBA4:24, SRQBA4:25, 
SRQBA4:26, SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, 
SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ4.4, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
A 4.17 SRQBA4:7, SRQBA4:8, SRQBA4:9, 
SRQBA4:10, SRQBA4:11, SRQBA4:12, 
SRQBA4:13, SRQBA4:14, SRQBA4:15, 
SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:23, SRQBA4:24, SRQBA4:25, 
SRQBA4:26, SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, 
SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ4.4, 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
8.      Data Exchange
C 4.17 SRQBA4:7, SRQBA4:8, SRQBA4:9, 
SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
I 4.17 SRQBA4:7, SRQBA4:8, SRQBA4:9, 
SRQBA4:16, SRQBA4:17, SRQBA4:18, 
SRQBA4:19, SRQBA4:20, SRQBA4:21, 
SRQBA4:27, SRQBA4:28, SRQBA4:29
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
A 4.17
0% 0
A 4.17 SRQ6.4, 
SRQ12
50% 2.09
84.43 47.95
Requirements (SREBP) Requirements (SQUARE)Coverage Coverage
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Table A4 4: Timetable BA 
 
Asset: Timetable
Requirements 
Categorization 
1.      Identification C 6.25 SRQBA5:5 75% 4.69 C 6.25 SRQ1.5 50%    3.13    
I 6.25 SRQBA5:5 75% 4.69 I 6.25 0%         -      
A - A -
2.      Authentication
C 4.17 SRQBA5:4, SRQBA5:5, SRQBA5:6, 
SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.5, SRQ 
3.5 75%    3.13    
I 4.17 SRQBA5:4, SRQBA5:5, SRQBA5:6, 
SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.5
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA5:6, SRQBA5:12 100% 4.17 A 4.17 SRQ2.5 50% 2.09
3.      Authorization  C 4.17 SRQBA5:1, SRQBA5:2, SRQBA5:3, 
SRQBA5:4, SRQBA5:5
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ1.5, 
SRQ3.5
100%    4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA5:1, SRQBA5:2, SRQBA5:3, 
SRQBA5:4, SRQBA5:5
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ2.5
50% 2.09
A 4.17 SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:22
0% 0
A 4.17 SRQ6.5,  
SRQ2.5
25% 1.04
4.      Accounting 
C 4.17 SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, 
SRQBA5:18
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ8.5, 
SRQ13.5
100%    4.17    
I 4.17 SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, 
SRQBA5:18
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ8.5, 
SRQ13.5
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, 
SRQBA5:18
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ13.5
75% 3.13
5.      Audit C 4.17 SRQBA5:18 75% 3.1275 C 4.17 0%         -      
I 4.17 SRQBA5:18
75% 3.1275
I 4.17 SRQ9, 
SRQ13.5
75% 3.13
A 4.17 SRQBA5:18 75% 3.1275 A 4.17 0% 0.00
6.      Non repudiation C - C -
I 12.5 SRQBA5:18 75% 9.375 I 12.5 SRQ13.5 25% 3.13
A - A -
7.      Immunity
C 4.17 SRQBA5:6, SRQBA5:7, SRQBA5:8, 
SRQBA5:9, SRQBA5:10, SRQBA5:11, 
SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, 
SRQBA5:19, SRQBA5:20, SRQBA5:21, 
SRQBA5:22
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ4.5 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
I 4.17 SRQBA5:6, SRQBA5:7, SRQBA5:8, 
SRQBA5:9, SRQBA5:10, SRQBA5:11, 
SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, 
SRQBA5:19, SRQBA5:20, SRQBA5:21, 
SRQBA5:22
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ4.5 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
A 4.17 SRQBA5:6, SRQBA5:7, SRQBA5:8, 
SRQBA5:9, SRQBA5:10, SRQBA5:11, 
SRQBA5:12, SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, 
SRQBA5:15, SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, 
SRQBA5:19, SRQBA5:20, SRQBA5:21, 
SRQBA5:22
100% 4.17
A 4.17 SRQ4.5 
SRQ14
75% 3.13
8.      Data Exchange
C 4.17 SRQBA5:6, SRQBA5:7, SRQBA5:12, 
SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, SRQBA5:15, 
SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, SRQBA5:22
100% 4.17
C 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
I 4.17 SRQBA5:6, SRQBA5:7, SRQBA5:12, 
SRQBA5:13, SRQBA5:14, SRQBA5:15, 
SRQBA5:16, SRQBA5:17, SRQBA5:22
100% 4.17
I 4.17 SRQ12
50% 2.09
A 4.17
0% 0
A 4.17 SRQ6.5, 
SRQ12
50% 2.09
82.34 51.08
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